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Older adults’ ability to make accurate metamemory judgments indicates that aging spares
metamemory (Eakin & Hertzog, 2006; 2012a; but see Souchay et al., 2006). However, age
differences in metamemory accuracy for emotional information, particularly lists of positive and
neutral words, indicate potential age-related impairment of metamemory (Tauber & Dunlosky,
2012; Flurry & Eakin, manuscript in preparation). These age differences may be explained by
potential cue overshadowing effects (Price & Yates, 1993) in which older adults primarily used
the salient cue, emotional valence, and overlooked additional cues that were diagnostic of
memory. We hypothesized that age differences in metamemory for emotional words may be
eliminated when older adults have a second salient and diagnostic cue to inform judgments of
learning (JOLs). We manipulated multiple cues, emotional valence and endorsement (Craik &
Tulving, 1975), using a category inclusion task in which participants responded “yes” or “no” to
endorse positive words (e.g. “champion”) or neutral words (e.g. “sphere”) as category members
(e.g. “is an achievement”). Age comparisons in free recall and JOL magnitude between levels of
emotional valence (positive, neutral) and levels of endorsement (yes, no) indicate that both
younger and older adults’ JOL magnitudes responded to emotional valence and endorsement

effects in which memory was higher for positive than neutral words, and “yes” versus “no”
words. JOL accuracy results demonstrate that both age groups’ JOLs were significantly accurate
above chance within each level of valence and endorsement. Age comparisons in JOL accuracy
suggest that including a second salient cue eliminated previously reported age differences in
metamemory for positive and neutral words. These results demonstrate that older adults can use
multiple cues to make accurate JOLs in the presence of a salient cue. This finding supports a
conclusion that previously reported age differences in metamemory for emotional words can be
attributed to cue overshadowing effects that diminished older adults’ ability to use multiple cues.
This conclusion has implications on the aging and metamemory literature such that additional
age differences reported in episodic metamemory may also be attributed to conditions that
hindered multiple cue use by older adults.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Aging is widely viewed to have a detrimental effect on memory (Kausler, 1994; NavehBenjamin, 2000); however, the literature has reached no such consensus regarding the impact of
aging on metamemory. Metamemory refers to the cognitive processes associated with
monitoring and controlling the memory system and can be measured by asking participants to
make assessments about their own memory. Nelson (1990) suggested that this knowledge is
gathered from monitoring memory processes, such as memory search, to inform decisions about
control processes, such as continuation versus termination of search.
According to the predominate inferential mechanism view of metamemory, metamemory
assessments rely on heuristics and inferences based on information related to the studied item,
rather than direct access to the state of memory itself (Scwhartz, 1994). Consistent with this
view, Koriat’s cue-utilization framework (1997) argues that metamemory assessments are
informed by heuristics, or cues, based on information available at the time of assessment. In turn,
the degree to which metamemory assessments are accurate is determined by the degree to which
the information on which assessments are based is predictive, or diagnostic (Hertzoget al.,
2010a; Eakin & Hertzog, 2006), of subsequent memory outcome. For the purposes of this
dissertation, metamemory accuracy will refer to relative accuracy, or the extent to which
assessments about memory for some information match actual memory for that information at
the item-level.
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Similar performance between age groups, or age equivalence, is found in measures of
metamemory accuracy for semantic memory (Allen-Burge & Storandt, 2000; Anooshian et al.,
1989; Backman & Karlsson, 1985; Butterfield et al., 1988; Connor et al., 1997; Eakin &
Hertzog, 2006; 2012a; Eakin et al., 2014; Hertzog et al., 2010b; Marquie & Huet, 2000;
Lachman & Lachman et al., 1979). Semantic memory refers to memory for facts and general
knowledge, and generally is not impaired with aging (Backman & Karlsson, 1985; Balota et al.,
2000). Comparatively, memory for newly learned or newly associated information——known as
episodic memory——is typically impaired with aging (Craik & McDowd, 1987; Kausler, 1994;
Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Older adults have consistently been shown to be as accurate as younger
adults when making metamemory assessments of semantic memory. However, the literature on
episodic metamemory has not reached such a consensus.
Much of the aging and metamemory literature supports a hypothesis that aging does not
produce deficits in episodic metamemory accuracy (Connor et al., 1997; Eakin and Hertzog,
2006, 2012a; Eakin et al., 2014; Hertzog et al., 2010b; Hertzog et al., 2002; Hertzog &
Dunlosky, 2011; MacLaverty and Hertzog, 2009). However, there remains conflicting evidence
leading to conclusions of an age-related deficit in episodic metamemory accuracy (Morson et al.,
2015; Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al., 2000; 2006; Thomas et al., 2011). These
contradictory results within the literature has hindered researchers’ ability to support a
conclusion of age equivalence in episodic metamemory accuracy. Making such a determination
is important for theories about the effects of aging on memory and metamemory, but also has
practical implications. A reliably accurate metamemory system could be particularly useful to
older adults to enable accurate monitoring of their memory. Accurate monitoring could mitigate
2

age-related memory deficits by informing control processes to better allocate or reserve cognitive
resources. If metamemory accuracy is intact with age, older adults can support their memory by
accurately assessing which information they are more likely to forget, such as a long shopping
list or the name of a person they just met and decide to spend extra time to memorize or write it
down. Further, uncovering which processes are and are not affected by aging can provide a better
understanding of how semantic and episodic metamemory work. For example, if both semantic
and episodic metamemory are similarly unaffected with aging, further support is provided to an
inferential mechanism view that metamemory is based on heuristics and inferences about
information that is currently available or retrieved from semantic memory, rather than direct
access to processes with established age-related deficits such as memory for newly learned
information.
Most of the literature has argued methodological and population difference to explain
disparate findings in terms of aging and metamemory. However, this dissertation addressed the
disparate conclusions in terms of whether prior studies finding age deficits in metamemory
hindered older adults from adequately monitoring all of the information critical for accurate
metamemory assessments. If older adults were unable to monitor diagnostic cues due to the
methods used in studies finding age-related deficits in episodic metamemory, then age-related
deficits in episodic metamemory reported in the literature may be eliminated by facilitating these
monitoring processes.

3

CHAPTER II
AGE-RELATED EFFECTS ON METAMEMORY
Age equivalence has been obtained in semantic metamemory even when semantic
memory is impaired (Eakin & Hertzog, 2006). Thus, one might still expect to find age
equivalence in episodic metamemory despite age deficits in episodic memory (Craik &
McDowd, 1987; Kausler, 1994; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Although the case against age-related
impairment in semantic metamemory appears to be agreed upon unanimously, the literature on
episodic metamemory is less orderly. Two lines of research stand out in this literature, each
reporting competing evidence for and against age equivalence in episodic metamemory.
Evidence for Age Equivalence in Episodic Metamemory Accuracy
Connor et al., (1997) reported initial evidence of age equivalence in episodic
metamemory using the judgment of learning (JOL) paradigm to examine metamemory for a list
of paired associates. JOLs are predictions made either immediately after encoding, or after a
delay, about how well recently learned information will be remembered on a future test. In this
paradigm, participants first studied paired associates in cue-target pairs (e.g., OCEAN–TREE).
After studying each pair, participants immediately made JOLs on a six-point (0, 20, 40, 60, 80,
and 100) scale. Finally, a memory test was given by presenting the cue (e.g., OCEAN) and
asking participants to retrieve the target previously paired with it (e.g., TREE). An age-related
deficit was observed in memory; older adults remembered fewer targets than younger adults
4

(Connor et al., 1997). However, no age-related deficit was found for metamemory accuracy as
measured by gamma correlations between predicted and actual recall (Connor et al., 1997).
Conner et al. (1997) replicated their initial finding of no age differences in JOL accuracy across
three more experiments, providing strong initial evidence that metamemory accuracy for
episodic information is unimpaired by aging.
Hertzog et al. (2002) manipulated related (e.g., SUGAR–COFFEE) and unrelated (e.g.,
SALT–MAYOR) cue-target pairs to examine the effect of associative relatedness on younger
and older adults’ JOLs. Both age groups recalled more related than unrelated pairs and both age
groups gave higher predictions to related than unrelated pairs, demonstrating JOL sensitivity to
the cue of relatedness1.Hertzog et al. (2002) reported an age deficit in JOL accuracy in the initial
experiment for which JOLs were made using a discrete yes/no scale; however, there was no main
effect of age on JOL accuracy in a second experiment for which JOLs were made using a
continuous 0 (certain not to remember) –100 (certain to remember) scale. This study
demonstrated that the scale used was critical in determining whether both younger and older
adults could use a diagnostic cue such as relatedness to accurately predict memory.
Eakin & Hertzog (2006) examined whether participants could accurately make feeling-ofknowing (FOK) judgments to predict cue-set-size effects on memory, and whether younger and
older adults could do so to the same degree. FOKs are retrieval-based assessments measuring the
degree to which one feels they would recognize an item if presented in a recognition test. No age

Sensitivity refers to the mean magnitude of metamemory assessments as compared to the mean
magnitude of memory performance (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008). When metamemory results
track the pattern of memory results, they are interpreted as “sensitive” to a cue or experimental
manipulation, indicating that both memory and metamemory responded to the factor in the same
way.
5
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differences were reported in measures of metamemory sensitivity or accuracy. Younger and
older adults’ metamemory assessments were equally accurate and both age groups were sensitive
to the cue-set-size manipulation. MacLaverty and Hertzog (2009) reported no main effect of age
on FOK accuracy for either immediate or delayed FOKs. Eakin and Hertzog (2012a) reported
below chance FOK accuracy for both age groups; no age differences were obtained. Although
FOK accuracy was impaired for both age groups, the impact of aging did not lead to a greater
impairment in the older versus the younger adults, a finding consistent with previous evidence
supporting age equivalence in metamemory. In addition to data from cross-sectional research,
longitudinal data reported by Hertzog et al. (2010b) also suggested no impairment of episodic
metamemory by age. Although they anticipated the possibility of a U-shaped function showing
that metacognitive accuracy was higher for middle-aged adults than younger or older adults,
Hertzog et al. observed a linear increase in JOL accuracy from ages 18 to 81. Taken together,
these studies examining JOL and FOK accuracy provide evidence of a reliable finding that aging
does not impair episodic metamemory accuracy between younger and older adults.
Evidence of a Lack of Age Equivalence in Episodic Metamemory Accuracy
Despite this evidence supporting age equivalence in metamemory, a parallel line of
research has presented evidence supporting the conclusion that older adults do show a deficit in
episodic metamemory accuracy (Morson et al., 2015; Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al., 2000;
2006; Thomas et al., 2011). Souchay et al. (2000) first reported an age-related deficit in FOK
accuracy between a group of younger and older adults. Each age group completed a cued-recall
test and made discrete yes/no FOKs before completing a forced-choice recognition task. Similar
to studies presented thus far, younger adults outperformed older adults in both cued recall and
6

recognition performance (Souchay et al., 2000). However, in contrast with the previous studies, a
significant effect of age was reported for FOK accuracy and interpreted as an age-related deficit
in retrieval-based episodic metamemory.
Similar to Souchay et al. (2000), Perrotin et al. (2005) reported significant age
differences in cued-recall and FOK accuracy, supporting Souchay et al.’s (2000) conclusion of
age-related impairment in episodic metamemory. Subsequent studies examining FOK accuracy
for older adults only reported that older adults made FOKs with above-chance accuracy, and did
not report age comparisons (Souchay et al., 2004; Perrotin et al., 2008). However, age
differences on FOK accuracy reported in between-groups comparisons by Souchay et al. (2000)
and Perrotin et al. (2005) provided the initial evidence for episodic metamemory impairment in
older adults.
Age deficits have also been reported specifically when assessing memory for emotional
words, suggesting that older adults’ metamemory may be impaired for certain types of stimuli.
Thomas et al. (2011) reported age differences in which younger adults made accurate FOKs for
emotional words and older adults made FOKs that were no better than chance. Thomas et al.
(2011) interpreted this age-related deficit as a failure of older adults to account for possible cues
such as accessibility. Tauber and Dunlosky (2012) replicated a finding by Zimmerman and
Kelley (2010) that younger adults made accurate JOLs for emotional words, however Tauber and
Dunlosky also reported age differences in which older adults were no better than chance at
making JOLs for emotional words when positive and neutral words were included in the same
list. Conventionally, Flurry and Eakin (manuscript in preparation) sought to explain these age
differences in terms of methodological issues, namely by taking more experimental control over
the materials and emotional words used to obtain them. Although a main effect of age on JOL
7

accuracy was not obtained, age differences in JOL accuracy within levels of emotional valence—
again specifically for positive words—were obtained, despite using a more ideal methodology.
Results indicative of age differences in JOL accuracy were surprising, especially given
that both Tauber and Dunlosky (2012) and Flurry and Eakin (unpublished) included at least one
author that had previously published evidence of age equivalence in episodic metamemory
accuracy and expected that same result for metamemory accuracy for emotional words. Further,
age differences in episodic metamemory accuracy had previously only been demonstrated in
retrieval-based FOKs, and Souchay’s (2000) conclusion of an age-related deficit in episodic
metamemory had only been attributed to an impact of aging on retrieval-based processes.
Concluding that age differences in JOL accuracy for emotional words are indicative of an agerelated deficit in episodic metamemory would extend the proposed age-related deficit to include
encoding-based processes as well. Tauber and Dunlosky (2012) noted that no main effect of age
on JOL accuracy was obtained and older adults made accurate JOLs for a list of negative and
neutral words, whereas Flurry and Eakin (unpublished) reported no main effect of age on JOL
accuracy and that only older adults’ JOLs, and not younger adults’ JOLs significantly more
accurate than chance for neutral words. Thus, unlike Thomas et al. (2011), both Tauber and
Dunlosky (2012) and Flurry and Eakin (unpublished) interpreted the bulk of their evidence as
supporting a conclusion that metamemory for emotional words was spared by aging. In the face
of studies that have shown age-invariance in episodic metamemory accuracy, these results from
Souchay et al. (2000), Perrotin et al. (2005), and Thomas et al. (2011) provided initial evidence
supporting conclusions of age-related deficits in episodic metamemory accuracy, with some
exceptions.

8

Resolving the Inconsistencies Regarding Age Effects on Episodic Metamemory Accuracy
The findings reported so far support both conclusions of age-equivalence in episodic
metamemory (Connor et al., 1997; Eakin & Hertzog, 2012a; Hertzog et al., 2002) and provide
evidence of an age-related deficit in episodic metamemory (Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al.,
2000; Thomas et al., 2011). Much of the research aimed towards resolving these inconsistent
findings in the literature has focused on addressing methodological discrepancies across studies.
A key methodological issue addressed in the literature was the lack of comparison between
semantic and episodic FOK. In order to conclude that—in contrast to semantic metamemory—
episodic metamemory was impaired with aging, it was important to compare both semantic and
episodic metamemory in the same experiment. Souchay et al. (2006) compared the effect of
aging on semantic and episodic metamemory in a single study using similar materials to examine
metamemory accuracy for both memory types and found that younger and older adults were
equally accurate for semantic metamemory, but older adults were less accurate than younger
adults for episodic metamemory.
One critique of Souchay et al.’s (2006) study is that, although the target was the same for
semantic and episodic metamemory, the semantic cues were different from episodic cues and
were more likely to elicit richer and more relevant information on which to base assessments
(Eakin et al., 2014; Hertzog et al., 2002). To resolve issues with Souchay et al.’s (2006)
experimental design, Eakin et al., (2014) examined FOK accuracy for semantic and episodic
memory in the same study using the same cues. Eakin et al. (2014) also identified other potential
methodological issues that could have affected the results in Souchay et al. (2006). Older adults
were less educated than younger adults in Souchay et al’s (2006) study (this was also a flaw in
other studies citing age differences in metamemory accuracy, i.e., Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay
9

et al., 2000), potentially allowing education level to contribute to age differences in FOK
accuracy. In addition, Souchay et al., (2006) had a minimal level of cognitive functioning as an
inclusion criterion imposed on their older adults. This low bar for inclusion was also true of
Perrotin et al., (2005) and Souchay et al., (2000). Although Souchay et al., (2006) reported that
their older adults scored within a high range of cognitive functioning on a dementia rating scale,
they did not administer the standard Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE; Cockrell & Folstein,
2002), a test of cognitive functioning. Additionally, the vocabulary test they gave did not show
better performance by their older than younger adults—which is the typical finding—and age
differences were atypically reported in semantic memory. This potential failure to appropriately
screen older adults in their study could have allowed the inclusion of older adults with dementia
or other disease or health-related cognitive deficits, leading to deficits in metamemory accuracy
not attributed to normal aging. These results point to the potential inclusion of low-educated or
cognitively impaired older adults whose results may have implications outside of the scope of
normal aging and provide additional context to understand the reported age differences in
episodic metamemory.
Eakin et al., (2014) tested only well-educated older adults who performed almost
perfectly on the MMSE (> (>27/30; Cockrell & Folstein, 2002) and who scored better than the
younger adults on the vocabulary test. In addition, as described, the same cues were used for
both semantic and episodic memory and metamemory. Eakin et al. (2014) reported that both
semantic and episodic metamemory accuracy was unimpaired by aging. This finding of age
equivalence in episodic metamemory was obtained by Eakin et al. (2014) in a study that
compared episodic and semantic FOK accuracy in a single study, using the same cues, while also
correcting for other methodological problems identified as potential factors producing age effects
10

in metamemory accuracy. Thus, their findings provided evidence that the age differences
reported by Souchay et al. (2000) and other studies testing episodic metamemory accuracy
(Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al., 2006) may be attributed to methodological issues, such as
the inclusion of low-educated or cognitively impaired older adults, or to the types of materials
used to test metamemory.
Having controlled for the methodological issues potentially explaining age differences in
FOK accuracy, Eakin et al.’s (2014) findings of age equivalence were presented as a closing
argument to end the back-and-forth methodological critiques between the two lines of research.
However, Morson et al., (2015) suggested that the use of pictorial cues resulted in the influence
of the picture superiority effect (Winograd et al., 1982) on memory that may have particularly
benefitted older adults, leading to accurate FOKs in their study. Morson et al. (2015) provided a
follow-up study that sought to examine semantic and episodic metamemory accuracy in the same
study without using pictorial cues. In response to methodological criticisms raised by Eakin et
al., (2014), Morson et al., (2015) used older adults whose education level equaled that of the
younger adults and established the recommended cutoff score of 28 for the MMSE for inclusion.
After addressing these issues, no age differences in FOK accuracy for semantic information were
observed, however FOK accuracy for episodic information was still significantly worse for older
than younger adults. These age differences were obtained despite age equivalence in recall and
recognition, providing an instance in which age differences in metamemory accuracy are
obtained despite age equivalence in episodic memory performance (see also Hertzog et al.,
2010a).
Morson et al. (2015) responded to much of the literature’s criticism of the methodology
studies reporting age-related deficits in episodic metamemory, and still obtained age differences
11

in FOK accuracy, further muddling a methodological solution to the rift in the literature.
However, methodological inconsistencies remained between Morson et al. (2015) and Eakin et
al. (2014) that could have contributed to the age differences obtained in FOK accuracy,
particularly the use of a discrete yes/no FOK scale. Age differences in JOL accuracy were
eliminated in Hertzog’s (2002) study indicating that discrete metamemory assessment scales may
impair older adults’ metamemory accuracy. A logical next step would be to compare the effect of
discrete vs continuous metamemory assessment scales on metamemory accuracy, however rather
than singling out yet another discrepancy in method, the literature may be better served by
examining what cognitive mechanisms are potentially impaired versus facilitated between the
two methodologies producing disparate results.
A review of this literature will show that studies reporting age equivalence versus age
differences in the literature on episodic metamemory have been conducted with a range of
different methods, subjects, and populations, and that findings of age differences in metamemory
accuracy have been explained by methodological issues such as cue type, sample inclusion, and
disparate memory performance. It is my interpretation that addressing methodological concerns
has yet to result in a consensus in the literature and the aim of this dissertation is not to continue
along that vein. However, noting these inconsistencies is particularly important to the aims of
this dissertation. This dissertation took the approach of identifying potential cognitive
mechanisms that may be underlying the aging effects that are and are not observed when testing
aging and episodic metamemory using different methodologies.
In particular, multiple cue use, or the ability to make fine-graded assessments of memory
based on multiple cues that could impact future memory is critical toward making accurate
metamemory predictions. Some methodologies and population characteristics used by studies
12

finding age differences could have hindered older adults from using more than one cue to inform
metamemory assessments, leading to the reported age deficits in metamemory accuracy. The
approach used in this dissertation could potentially explain the discrepancies reported in the
aging and episodic metamemory literature in terms of how methodological or population
differences impact older adults’ ability to base metamemory assessments on multiple cues.
Potential effects of the methodological differences identified here on multiple cue use will be
discussed in relation to the inconsistent aging effects on episodic metamemory. First, however,
with the goal of understanding multiple cue use, the theoretical bases underlying metamemory
assessments are addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THE CUE-UTILIZATION FRAMEWORK
The process of using information to inform metamemory assessments can be better
understood by examining Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework. The uninitiated may hold
the assumption that metamemory predictions are based on direct access to the state of memory
itself at the time of predictions. Indeed, early metamemory researchers held this view, (Arbuckle
& Cuddy, 1969; Hart, 1965), stating that people can explicitly monitor the strength of the
memory trace. However, subsequent findings of dissociations between memory and
metamemory led to the conclusion that assessments are based on inferences about memory
(Begg et al., 1989; Begg et al., 1991; Koriat, 1993; Metcalfe et al., 1993; see Schwartz, 1994 for
a review), rather than any direct access to memory itself.
Koriat (1997) identified three types of cues: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. Intrinsic
cues are item characteristics, such as valence or word frequency. Extrinsic cues are encoding
conditions such as presentation time or number of study opportunities and also encoding
operations employed by the learner, such as interactive imagery or elaborative processing.
Mnemonic cues are heuristics based on information internal to the participant, such as how
familiar a cue is to the participant (i.e.. cue familiarity) or how much information comes to mind
at the time of assessment (i.e. accessibility).
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Figure 1.

Theory-Based and Experience-Based Influences on JOLs.

Intrinsic and extrinsic cues can influence metamemory assessments directly through
theory-based analytic inferences (see Figure 1) in which participants give higher assessments to
items with characteristics or encoding conditions they believe will make the target more
memorable. For instance, people gave higher assessments to cues that were studied with related
versus non-related targets (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969; Hertzog et al., 2002; Rabinowitz et al.,
1982) and to items that were studied repeatedly versus items that were studied only once
(Lovelace, 1984; Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980). However, Lovelace (1990) argued that
people may be less aware of memory effects associated with extrinsic cues than those associated
with intrinsic cues, citing evidence that metamemory assessments were not always influenced by
extrinsic cues such as study time (Coyne, 1985; but see Mazzoni et al., 1990) or levels of
processing (Rabinowitz et al., 1982; Shaw & Craik, 1989). Koriat (1997) also reported that JOLs
were less sensitive to extrinsic study-repetition cues than to intrinsic item-difficulty cues.
Koriat et al., (2004) later interpreted JOL insensitivity to retention interval, an extrinsic
cue, to suggest that people may not spontaneously use theory-based cues to make JOLs and that
experience-based mnemonic cues may overshadow theory-based intrinsic or extrinsic cues.
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Mnemonic cues are internal to the participant and are based on the unique encoding and/or
retrieval experience of that individual. Various mnemonic cues shown to impact metamemory
assessments include cue familiarity (Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987), accessibility (Dunlosky
& Nelson, 1992; Koriat, 1993), ease of retrieval (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993), ease of processing
(Begg et al., 1989), and memory for past test performance (MTP; Finn & Metcalfe, 2008;
Hertzog et al., 2013). Mnemonic cues are referred to as experience-based and nonanalytic in the
sense that they are based on subjective, internal feelings rather than on analytic theories about
characteristics of the cue or study context. However, according to the cue-utilization framework,
intrinsic and extrinsic cues can influence JOLs indirectly via their influence on mnemonic cues
(see Figure 1). Intrinsic cues such as valence, and extrinsic cues such as study repetition modify
mnemonic cues to the extent that these factors impact the encoding and retrieval experience. For
example, the influence of an intrinsic factor such as concreteness has been shown to be mediated
by a mnemonic factor such as ease of processing (Begg et al., 1989). Likewise, experience-based
mnemonic cues such as cue familiarity and encoding fluency, a mnemonic cue typically referring
to how quickly an item is processed, are influenced by extrinsic factors such as previous
exposure to an item (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). This mediation suggests
that JOLs based on mnemonic cues are informed, not by any theory about relative memorability
of concrete versus abstract words, but rather by the experience that more concrete words are
easier to process.
Koriat’s (1993) accessibility model suggests that another mnemonic cue, accessibility,
may account for effects of theory-based cues such as valence on JOL magnitude, to the extent
that the additional context of emotional words brought more information to mind than neutral
words. Such a mediation appears to suggest that theory-based inferences are not needed to
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explain the bases of JOLs, however experience-based cues cannot explain studies in which
people have demonstrated the ability to predict others’ memory performance (Lovelace, 1984;
Hertzog et al., 2002). This ability demonstrates that JOLs can be informed by theories and shared
information about items or study conditions that is unrelated to individual experience, and
indicative of the direct use of intrinsic and extrinsic cues (Lovelace, 1984; Hertzog et al., 2002).
Teasing apart how these various types of theory-based and experience-based cues interact
remains an important area of study in the metamemory literature with further implications
towards the aging literature. For example, older adults’ theory-based inferences may be required
to be updated over time to account for age differences such as positivity bias (Charles et al.,
2003).
How Do Cues Affect Metamemory Accuracy?
According to the cue-utilization framework, metamemory assessments will be accurate to
the extent that the cues that inform the assessments are diagnostic of whether the word will be
recalled (Koriat, 1997). For example, if metamemory assessments about emotional words are
based primarily on an intrinsic cue such as valence, these assessments will be accurate to the
extent that emotionally charged words are recalled at a higher rate than neutral words. Likewise,
if memory is driven by an extrinsic factor, such as study time or levels of processing,
metamemory assessments will be inaccurate if these cues are ignored during assessment. Many
cues have been demonstrated to be diagnostic with some probability including intrinsic cues such
as associative relatedness, which produces both increased JOLs and increased memory for
related versus unrelated cue-target pairs (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969; Hertzog et al., 2002).
Likewise, extrinsic cues such as study repetition (Lovelace, 1984; Zechmeister & Shaughnessy,
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1980) and mnemonic cues such as cue familiarity (Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Reder, 1987) and
accessibility (Koriat, 1993; 1995; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001) have proven to be diagnostic of
recall. Providing higher assessments to items that were studied multiple times versus only once,
items that were more familiar, and that brought to mind more information tracked subsequent
memory results and led to accurate metamemory.
However, not all cues that influence metamemory assessments are diagnostic of memory.
For example, people gave higher predictions to cues presented in larger versus smaller text
(Rhodes & Castel, 2008), words spoken in a louder voice (Rhodes & Castel, 2009), and cue
words that were paired with a second, interfering semantic associate (Eakin, 2005) even though
none of these features proved to be diagnostic of memory. Metamemory assessments will be
accurate to the extent that they are influenced by cues that are diagnostic of memory. The reverse
is also true; metamemory assessments will be inaccurate if the cues on which they are based are
non-diagnostic of memory and override other potential cues that could have been more
diagnostic of memory. Thus, the ability to consider diagnostic cues—and inhibit non-diagnostic
cues—is essential to making accurate metamemory assessments.
Effects of Aging on Cue Utilization
Lovelace (1990) suggested that aging may impair the ability to monitor the effect of
extrinsic cues on memory, citing evidence that younger adults updated their knowledge between
metamemory predictions and postdictions to account for instructed encoding strategy, whereas
older adults did not (Brigham & Pressley, 1988). This evidence of a potential age deficit in the
ability to use extrinsic cues, suggests that some of the age deficits in metamemory accuracy may
be due to aging effects on the ability to use certain types of diagnostic cues. Belying this
18

conclusion, however, Coyne (1985) demonstrated that older adults can use extrinsic cues such as
study time equally as well as younger adults. What might explain the differences in the findings
is not differences in the ability to use a single diagnostic cue; rather, the inability of older adults
to use multiple diagnostic cues.
Multiple cue use refers to the ability to consider more than one cue to inform
metamemory assessments and has been demonstrated by both younger and older adults (Hertzog
et al., 2002). However, there is little research on how different types of intrinsic, extrinsic, and
mnemonic cues are considered and used in combination to inform metamemory assessments (but
see Undorf et al., 2018), and how multiple cue use is impacted by aging. If consideration of
multiple cues is necessary for accurate predictions, potential age differences in the ability to use
certain types of cues, such as older adults’ failure to account for the effect of an extrinsic cue in
Brigham & Pressley’s (1988) study, could lead to age differences in metamemory accuracy.
Further, potential interactions between various intrinsic, extrinsic or mnemonic cue types may
impact multiple cue use differently between age groups. Finally, multiple cue use by older adults
may be impeded under some conditions, and facilitated for others, perhaps explaining age
difference in metamemory accuracy.
The Role of Aging and Methodology on Multiple Cue Use
Research on multiple cue use suggests that accounting for multiple cues is critical to
metamemory accuracy when multiple factors impact memory. Koriat (1995) reported a study in
which accurate FOKs were influenced by both accessibility and encoding fluency cues,
suggesting that accurate metamemory assessments could be achieved by combining multiple
heuristics. Further, some studies show that metamemory accuracy can be improved by
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accounting for mnemonic cues in addition to intrinsic cues (Hertzog et al., 2002; Zimmerman &
Kelley, 2010). Hertzog et al., (2002) showed that younger and older adults’ metamemory
accuracy can be improved by accounting for mnemonic cues in addition to an intrinsic cue,
relatedness (Hertzog, 2002). Zimmerman and Kelley (2010) showed that that younger adults
increased their JOL accuracy for emotional words across two trials from the use of the intrinsic
cue of valence to adding consideration of mnemonic cues such as familiarity or memory for past
test performance. Use of multiple mnemonic cues has been reported in younger adults by Koriat
& Ma’ayan (2005) who observed JOLs based on encoding fluency and retrieval fluency; and in
both younger and older adults by Hines et al. (2015), who reported that JOLs were based on
encoding fluency and memory for past test performance. Hertzog et al., (2010b) reported that
older adults made JOLs based on both relatedness, an intrinsic cue manipulated by researchers,
and strategy use, an extrinsic cue that was not manipulated Hertzog et al. (2014) reported that
younger adults showed JOL sensitivity to both concreteness and study repetition cues, indicating
that younger adults combined intrinsic and extrinsic cues to inform their metamemory
assessments. These studies establish that metamemory accuracy will depend on multiple cue use
to inform metamemory assessments when more than one cue is diagnostic of actual memory
performance and that older adults can use multiple cues; however, some methodological
conditions can hinder multiple cue use, especially for older adults.
Using a blunt, discrete metamemory assessment scale could hinder multiple cue use by
older adults. As discussed, Hertzog et al., (2002) showed that a finding of age equivalence
versus age deficits in metamemory accuracy depended on whether a continuous or discrete scale
was used to assess metamemory. In fact, the disparate lines of research reporting age versus age
deficits in metamemory can be arranged almost seamlessly into the same groups using type of
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scale to sort them into continuous versus discrete metamemory scales, as shown in Table 1. This
distinction is critical because the use of a discrete scale could impair the ability of both younger
and older adults to report the influence of multiple cues on metamemory assessments, even if
they are able to use them. Decreased precision in discrete scales may prevent people from
accounting for additional cues or information after basing a yes/no decision on an initial cue.
There is no way to demonstrate degrees of “yes-ness” or to indicate that although one cue
influences a yes response, another cue might temper or intensify that “yes-ness,” when being
able to do so would result in more accurate metamemory assessments.
Table 1
Methodological Inconsistencies in the Metamemory and Aging Literature
Measure

Education level

Age Equivalence in

Age Deficit in

Episodic Metamemory Accuracy

Episodic Metamemory Accuracy

Younger adults ≤ Older adults

Younger adults > Older adults
(Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al., 2000, 2006)

MMSE

Time-constraints

MMSE inclusion criterion ≥ 28/30

MMSE inclusion criterion ≥ 26/30

(Eakin & Hertzog, 2006, 2012a; Eakin et al., 2014)

(Souchay et al., 2000; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004)

20s (Connor et al., 1997) or Untimed

5s (Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al., 2000, 2006)

(Eakin & Hertzog, 2006, 2012a; MacLaverty &

or 10s (Sacher et al.. 2013)

Hertzog, 2009)

Scale type

Continuous Scale (Eakin & Hertzog, 2006,

Discrete Scale (Morson et al., 2015; Perrotin et

2012a; Eakin et al., 2014; Hertzog et al., 2002;

al., 2005; Sacher et al., 2013; Souchay et al., 2000;

MacLaverty & Hertzog, 2009)

2006)
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Another issue is the use of timed or speeded metamemory assessments. Having to make
assessments quickly may not have allowed older adults enough time to account for multiple cues
to inform their assessments, leading to inaccurate metamemory. Age deficits in metamemory
accuracy were reported more often by studies providing less time for metamemory assessments
(Perrotin et al., 2005; Sacher et al., 2013; Souchay et al., 2000; 2006) and less often when more
time was provided to make assessments (Connor et al., 1997; Eakin & Hertzog, 2006, 2012a;
MacLaverty & Hertzog, 2009). Providing more time to make metamemory assessments may
have facilitated multiple cue use in studies reporting age equivalence in metamemory accuracy,
whereas providing less time may have been detrimental in studies reported age deficits in
metamemory.
Impediments to multiple cue use, such as using discrete scales and speeded judgments
may be exacerbated by age-related processes; several general theories of cognitive aging could
account for why older adults’ metamemory accuracy may be particularly affected when multiple
cue use is constrained. According to the general slowing hypothesis (Salthouse, 1996), any
cognitive process takes longer for older than for younger adults because of the overall slowing
effect of aging on processing speed, suggesting that older adults require additional time to
consider multiple cues to inform each judgment. Frontal lobe dysfunction theory (Craik et al.,
1990; Ferguson et al., 1992) proposed that reduced volume and functioning of the frontal lobes
with aging reduces older adults’ working memory capacity. The potential for impaired cognition
to impact multiple cue use is enhanced when populations of older adults with lower education
levels and/or lower cognitive functioning are included. Studies reporting age equivalence in
metamemory accuracy controlled for education level between age groups (Connor et al., 1997,
Eakin & Hertzog, 2006, 2012a; Eakin et al., 2014; Hertzog et al., 2002, 2010b; MacLaverty &
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Hertzog, 2009). On the other hand, many of the studies reporting age differences in metamemory
accuracy failed to control for age differences in education level or cognitive functioning
(Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et al., 2000; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). Table 1 demonstrates
this delineation. Additionally, some studies reporting age deficits had low cut-off scores on the
MMSE, operationalized as scores of less than 27 of 30 possible points. Older adults with lower
education or cognitive functioning may have been more likely to have deficits in processes
critical to multiple cue use such as working memory or inhibition.
This dissertation proposed that the methodological and population differences across
studies that did and did not find age differences in metamemory accuracy could have been due to
the degree to which they potentially impacting multiple-cue use. To provide the optimal method
to determine whether older adults can use multiple cues, this dissertation tested older adults who
were well-educated, had high cognitive functioning as evidenced by scores greater than 28/30 on
the MMSE and high scores on the Shipley vocabulary test. In addition, both younger and older
adults were given extensive time to make their metamemory assessments and used a continuous
scale to make their assessments.
Cue Overshadowing May Affect Older Adults’ Ability to Use Multiple Cues
In addition to the potential negative impact of aging on cognition on older adults’ ability
to use multiple cues, older adults may have even more difficulty considering additional cues in
the presence of a salient cue. Cue salience may be especially critical when exploring how
younger and older adults “choose” which cues to base their assessments on, and the presence or
absence of a salient cue could be another factor contributing to the discrepant findings regarding
aging and metamemory accuracy. Koriat and Ma’ayan (2005) demonstrated that people based
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their JOLs on the most salient cue at the time of prediction, rather than choosing the most
diagnostic available cue. The authors argued that participants were unlikely to have insight to
which subjective, mnemonic cues would be diagnostic under various conditions, and instead
made JOLs according to which cue was most salient at the time of prediction. JOLs were based
on the most salient cues and were accurate because the most salient cues coincidentally were
diagnostic of memory in that study.
Cues that are salient but, yet non-diagnostic of memory, would likewise lead to
inaccurate metamemory assessments. Considering that inhibitory processing ability declines with
age, (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), disregarding a particularly salient but non-diagnostic cue could be
even more difficult for older adults, potentially impeding their ability to use more diagnostic
cues. Even a particularly salient diagnostic cue could impair JOL accuracy by overshadowing
other cues that are more diagnostic than the salient cue, or by overshadowing cues that could
improve metamemory accuracy if considered in conjunction with the salient cue. This failure to
account for diagnostic cues in the presence of more salient cues is referred to as cue
overshadowing effect (Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; Hertzog et al., 2002; Price & Yates, 1993).
Hertzog et al. (2002) demonstrated cue overshadowing in a study that required using
multiple cues to make accurate JOLs. Hertzog et al. (2002) manipulated an intrinsic cue,
associative relatedness, between cue-target pairs and determined that both younger and older
adults used relatedness to inform JOLs. Even after accounting for relatedness, however, JOLs
were only accurate when additionally influenced by privileged access, a mnemonic cue referring
to knowledge of one’s encoding experience and measured by the extent to which JOLs are more
highly correlated with one’s own recall than another subject’s recall. Hertzog et al. (2002) argued
that when both intrinsic and mnemonic cues are diagnostic of memory, intrinsic cues may be
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more salient because they are identifiable in the stimuli themselves, as opposed to mnemonic
cues that require monitoring of changing internal states (but see Koriat et al., 2004). Hertzog et
al. proposed that these differences in salience between cues can lead to cue overshadowing
effects in which metamemory accuracy is diminished to the extent that JOLs are informed by a
single, salient cue, and less informed by additional cues that are diagnostic of memory.
Cue overshadowing affects both younger and older adults (Hertzog et al., 2002; Price &
Yates, 1993) but may particularly impede the ability of older adults to use multiple cues due to
other effects of cognitive aging, such as slowed processing, and working memory and inhibition
deficits associated with frontal lobe dysfunction. Hertzog et al. (2002) reported no effect of age
on overall JOL accuracy; however, an age-related deficit in JOL accuracy was reported within
conditions of relatedness. Older adults could discriminate which items would be recalled
between, but not within, the related and unrelated pairs. This finding suggests older adults based
their JOLs primarily on relatedness and were not able to account for additional cues measured by
privileged access to inform their JOLs. Privileged access indicates that diagnostic cues were
available to distinguish within each condition of relatedness, indicating that the age differences
in JOL accuracy within conditions can be attributed to a failure to use these cues additively with
relatedness to inform JOLs. Hertzog et al. (2002) interpreted these age differences in JOL
accuracy within relatedness conditions as evidence of a cue overshadowing effect: because of
limitations on cognitive resources, attending to a salient cue such as relatedness limited older
adults’ ability to account for additional cues, such as privileged access. Taken together with
Brigham & Pressley’s (1988) conclusion that older adults could not monitor the impact of
extrinsic factors on memory, these results suggest that the cue overshadowing effect of intrinsic
over mnemonic and extrinsic cues may be augmented by age. These findings suggest that age25

related impairment in multiple-cue use could potentially impair older adults’ metamemory
accuracy, particularly when additional mnemonic or extrinsic cues must be considered after
accounting for a salient intrinsic cue.
Hertzog et al. (2002) suggested that age differences in episodic metamemory accuracy
may be attributed to a failure by older adults to use multiple cues that are diagnostic of memory
performance. Further, Hertzog et al. (2002) suggested the overshadowing effect may be
implicated in inaccurate metamemory predictions by older adults, where older adults may focus
on a salient cue such as relatedness and overlook additional cues that are diagnostic of memory.
In situations in which multiple cues are diagnostic of memory, metamemory accuracy may
depend on selectively using the cues that are diagnostic of memory and inhibiting salient or nondiagnostic cues. Koriat and Ma’ayan’s (2005) conclusion that JOLs are based on the most salient
cue rather than diagnosticity indicates that cue salience may interfere with effective multiple-cue
use. Further, these cue salience effects may be exacerbated by age to the extent that older adults
are less efficient than younger adults at inhibiting salient, yet non-diagnostic, cues.
Subsequent studies have further demonstrated that older adults can use multiple cues to
inform their metamemory assessments under certain conditions (Hertzog et al., 2010b; Hines et
al., 2015). Hertzog et al. (2010b) replicated Hertzog et al.’s (2002) findings that older adults’
JOL accuracy was greater for unrelated than related items. However, this discrepancy in JOL
accuracy was eliminated by including strategy use as a cue, indicating that both younger and
older adults can use multiple cues to influence JOLs, and that both intrinsic and extrinsic cues
influenced their JOLs under these conditions. This literature on aging and multiple cue use
suggests that older adults can use multiple cues to make accurate JOLs, but do not do so under
all conditions, such as in the presence of a single salient cue.
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CHAPTER IV
OVERSHADOWING MAY EXPLAIN AGE DIFFERENCES IN METAMEMORY FOR
EMOTIONAL WORDS
In addition to general aging effects leading to the overshadowing effect, older adults’
ability to use multiple cues may be hindered by overshadowing from salient cues. Valence may
be a particularly salient cue due to emotional salience effects and perhaps more so for older
adults considering the socio-emotional selectivity theory that older adults tend to allocate more
cognitive resources to positive stimuli (Carstensen, 1993; 2006). Emotional salience effects (see
also emotional enhancement effects, emotional memory effects) refer to increased memory for
emotionally valenced stimuli over neutral stimuli and have been explained both in terms of
encoding and elaboration effects of emotional context on memory (Hamann, 2001; Reisberg &
Heur, 2003) and in terms of emotional memory modulation through increased activity and longterm potentiation in the amygdala (Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002; McGaugh, 2000). Enhanced
memory for emotionally valenced materials has been demonstrated in studies examining memory
for a multitude of stimuli such as emotional words (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004), images (Charles
et al., 2003) and events (Fiske, 1980) using dependent measures such as free recall (Charles et
al., 2003), cued recall (Kensinger et al., 2004), and recognition memory (Charles et al., 2003).
Both younger and older adults exhibit emotional salience effects in that they are more
likely to recall information assessed as positive or negative versus neutral (Fung & Carstensen,
2003). However, age effects including negativity bias (Baumeister et al., 2001), positivity bias,
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and positivity effects (Charles et al., 2003; Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008) demonstrate that aging
has an impact on which types of emotional information benefit memory. Younger adults
typically demonstrate a negativity bias by remembering more negative than positive information
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001). In contrast, older adults typically demonstrate either positivity effects
in which memory is similar for positive and negative information (e.g., Charles et al., 2003,
Experiment 2), or a positivity bias in which memory is greater for positive than negative
information (e.g., Charles et al., 2003, Experiment 1).
Theoretical explanations for age differences in emotional memory include motivational
accounts such as socio-emotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 1993; 2006), which attributes
age differences in memory for emotional information to a tendency by older adults to allocate
more cognitive resources (i.e., attention) to positive than to negative information. Socioemotional selectivity theory suggests that older adults are motivated by perceived time
constraints to value emotionally satisfying information and thus, they are less inclined to focus
on negative information. In contrast, younger adults are proposed to prioritize novelty and
knowledge acquisition over emotion regulation, resulting in better memory for negative than for
positive information. Alternatively, Cacioppo et al., (2011) attributed positivity effects to agerelated neural degeneration of the amygdala that weakens older adults’ emotional response to
negative stimuli resulting in fewer cognitive resources being allocated to negative stimuli.
However, the hypothesis that decreased cognitive resources explains the positivity effect was not
supported by research showing that older adults with Alzheimer’s disease and older adults who
were distracted at encoding, both presumed to have decreased cognitive resources, failed to
demonstrate positivity effects, (Hamann, 2001; Kalenzaga et al., 2016; Kensinger et al., 2002).
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JOLs have also been found to be higher for emotional information, demonstrating along
with salience effects in memory that valence is a salient and diagnostic cue (Charles et al., 2003).
Consequent to socio-emotional selectivity theory, increased allocation of cognitive resources to
positive information may impair metamemory accuracy for emotional material to the extent that
this increased focus on positive information overshadows other diagnostic cues. This possibility
is underscored by surprising results reported from studies examining metamemory for emotional
words. Even with high-functioning older adults and using a continuous JOL scale, age
differences in JOL accuracy have been obtained for lists containing positive and neutral words
(Flurry & Eakin, unpublished; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Thomas et al., 2011). These findings
point towards an age-related deficit in metamemory accuracy that cannot be attributed to
population effects or the type of scale used. Rather, age differences in emotional information
processing may be differentially impacting an underlying cognitive mechanism such as multiplecue use.
Consistent with Koriat’s (2004) model, valence can be used as a theory-based, intrinsic
cue about the benefit of an item’s emotional context and can also influence experience-based
mnemonic cues such as accessibility. Thus, metamemory assessments will be influenced by
theory-based inferences about valence to the extent that emotional words are perceived to be
more memorable and influenced by experience-based inferences such as accessibility to the
extent that more information is provided by the additional context of emotion. More so, when
more than one cue is diagnostic of memory for emotional words, people must also consider other
diagnostic cues in addition to valence in order to make accurate predictions about memory for
emotional words. For instance, giving higher assessments to positive than neutral words will
produce some degree of metamemory accuracy, but not all of the positive words will be recalled
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and not all of the neutral words will be forgotten. Assessments that are based on multiple cues
will discriminate within each level of valence which of the positive words, and which of the
neutral words, would be recalled versus forgotten.
In Zimmerman and Kelley’s (2010) study younger adults improved their JOL accuracy
for emotional words by utilizing additional mnemonic cues such as familiarity or memory for
past test performance, indicating that they could consider valence without it overshadowing the
use of other diagnostic cues to inform their assessments. Conversely, older adults in Tauber &
Dunlosky (2012) demonstrated age deficits in JOL accuracy for emotional words, specifically
when positive and neutral words were included in the same list. Thomas et al. (2011) also
obtained age differences in FOK accuracy for a list of emotional words. Flurry and Eakin
(manuscript in preparation) reported age differences in JOL accuracy for positive words, in
which older adults gave higher JOLs for positive than for neutral words, but beyond that were
unable to discriminate among the positive words which they would remember and which they
would not. Further, gamma correlations between JOLs and each word’s emotional valence were
stronger for older versus younger adults, suggesting valence may have been an especially salient
cue for older adults. The use of a salient intrinsic cue, in this case valence, may have
overshadowed additional cues potentially diagnostic of recall. Valence may be especially salient
to older adults considering older adults’ preference for attending to positive information as
described by the socio-emotional selectivity theory (Charles et al., 2003). The finding that older
adults failed to discriminate recalled from unrecalled words within the positive words suggests
that, after accounting for emotional valence, older adults may have been unable to use additional
cues to discriminate which positive words would be recalled versus unrecalled. Older adults in
Flurry and Eakin’s (unpublished) study may have been susceptible to cue overshadowing from
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valence, disrupting their ability to use additional cues to distinguish which of the positive or
neutral words were more likely to be recalled within each group of words.
Inaccurate JOLs for positive words by older adults in Flurry and Eakin’s study
(unpublished) may be explained by cue overshadowing effects that inhibited the use of additional
cues such as spontaneous strategy use that were not explicitly manipulated but may have
impacted memory. Older adults may be especially susceptible to overshadowing effects because
of working memory and inhibitory deficits (Craik et al., 1990; Ferguson et al., 1992; Hasher &
Zacks, 1988). Once older adults allocate attention to positive information, older adults may not
have the working memory capacity to divide that attention in order to also focus on other cues,
even if they are also diagnostic of memory. Further, due to inhibitory deficits (Hasher & Zacks,
1988), older adults may have difficulty ignoring salient cues, even if they are not diagnostic.
Thus, in addition to the methodological issues addressed previously, cue salience may
differentially affect multiple cue use between younger and older adults. Cue overshadowing
effects may explain reports of age differences in metamemory for emotional words, because an
over-reliance on emotional valence may hinder multiple cue use and impair older adults’
metamemory accuracy.
Multiple cue use could be particularly impacted for older adults under conditions in
which available cues include a salient cue, such as in studies reporting age-related deficits in JOL
accuracy for emotional words. Further, additional methodological differences between studies
reporting age equivalence versus age deficits in metamemory accuracy, may differentially impact
multiple cue use by older adults. The two aims of this dissertation, expanded below, were
designed to address the role of multiple-cue use on age-effects in metamemory accuracy. Two
key issues will be addressed in order to facilitate multiple cue use by older adults: a) two salient
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and diagnostic cues will be experimentally manipulated in order to prevent cue overshadowing
by emotional valence, and b) methodological decisions will be made in order to prevent study
conditions from impeding multiple cue use by older adults.
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CHAPTER V
AIMS
Aim 1
The first aim of this experiment is to examine whether older adults can use multiple cues
to inform their metamemory assessments for emotional words. Because one of the cues being
manipulated is emotional valence, which has the potential to overshadow other diagnostic cues,
the second cue manipulated will be equally salient in order to eliminate the potential cueovershadowing effects of valence reported in previous experiments using emotional words. The
second salient cue to be manipulated will be endorsement, referring to whether or not
participants endorse a response to a task, typically by answering “yes” or “no”.
People have demonstrated better memory for items they assign yes responses to than
items they assign “no” responses to (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Craik and Tulving (1975)
suggested that agreeing to encoding questions led to the formation of a cohesive, integrated unit
between the target item and the context of the question that increases memory by providing
context in addition to the question and target item individually. For example, in a category
inclusion task (e.g. “Is an athlete” – “REFRIGERATOR”) the integration of the category and the
item information that results from a “yes” response may lead to a unified concept of “athlete”
and “refrigerator”, and perhaps lead to deeper processing such as interactive imagery. In contrast,
a “no” response would lead to no such integration, and potentially to slower and more shallow
processing of the item.
33

Endorsement can be argued as a mnemonic cue, due to the endorsement decision being
internal to the participant, and the manipulated encoding conditions being susceptible to
individual differences. For example, researchers may classify (“Is an athlete” –
“REFRIGERATOR”) as likely to produce a “no” response because the concepts are unrelated.
However, someone familiar with former American football player William “The Refrigerator”
Perry may respond “yes” and perform rich processing of the category-word pair by using
imagery. However, endorsement will be classified in our study as an extrinsic cue because we
are manipulating the likelihood of encoding operations such as interactive imagery or levels of
processing to be performed by the learner. Thus, we will assume that endorsement cues are
primarily driven by theory-based inferences or beliefs about the memory benefit of additional
encoding operations induced by responding “yes” rather than “no”.
Because of the effect of the endorsement factor on memory, using endorsement as a cue
to inform JOLs is diagnostic to the extent that people give higher predictions and also recall
more words after a “yes” response and give lower predictions and recall less words after a “no”
response. It is important to note that participants need not be aware of “yes” versus “no”
endorsement effects on memory for endorsement to be diagnostic. Rather, endorsement is
diagnostic as a cue because memory performance and metamemory predictions respond in the
same way to “yes” versus “no” responses, even if predictions were driven by theories about the
use of additional encoding operations such as imagery and not by theories about the implications
of responding “yes” versus “no”. No endorsement effects on metamemory are published to our
knowledge, however endorsement was selected to be manipulated after obtaining pilot data
demonstrating an effect of endorsement on both memory and JOL magnitude. Additional pilot

34

data included a significant correlation between JOLs and endorsement independent of valence,
indicating endorsement was sufficiently salient to influence JOLs.
Endorsement (yes, no) will be crossed with valence (positive, neutral) in a mixed list
during encoding. Valence was manipulated by presenting 20 positive words (e.g. jewel) and 20
neutral words (e.g. shadow) as potential answers to a category inclusion task in which
participants are asked to respond “yes” or “no” to indicate whether they agree that the presented
word is a member of the category. Endorsement was manipulated by varying whether or not each
presented word is a member of the presented category in a meaningful way. In the encoding
phase, participants will be first be presented with a single positive or neutral word. After a brief
presentation of the positive or neutral word, participants will be presented with a category
inclusion task and asked to respond “yes” or “no” to whether they agree that the word is a
member of the category (e.g. JEWEL - “Is a treasure”). Half of each group of positive and
neutral words will be presented with categories likely to elicit a “yes” response, and the other
half of each group was presented with categories likely to elicit a “no” response (e.g. JEWEL “Is an intuition”). Participants will then be asked to assess whether they would recall the
presented word on a later test using a 0 (certain not to recall) to 100 (certain to recall) JOL scale.
Metamemory accuracy will be measured between age groups using gamma correlations between
JOLs and recall performance for positive versus neutral words and words given “yes” versus
“no” responses. Recall performance and JOL magnitude will be measured and analyzed in terms
of endorsement and valence effects.
•

H1a: Free recall will be similar for younger and older adults, due to methodological
considerations that are designed to benefit older adults’ memory.

•

H1b: Free recall will be higher for positive than neutral words.
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•

H1c: Free recall will be higher for words producing “yes” responses than for words
producing “no” responses.

•

H2a: Overall, JOLs will be similar in magnitude for younger and older adults.

•

H2b: JOLs will be higher for positive than neutral words.

•

H2c: JOLs will be higher for words producing “yes” responses than for words producing
“no” responses.

•

H2d: Both younger and older adults are predicted to have JOLs that vary in magnitude
with both factors.
Aim 2
The second aim of the experiment is to examine whether age differences reported in

metamemory accuracy for emotional words—particularly for positive words—can be eliminated
by providing an additional salient, diagnostic cue, endorsement, to consider when making JOLs.
Providing an additional cue to help them discriminate which positive and neutral words will be
recalled should lead to above-chance JOL accuracy and elimination of age differences in
metamemory accuracy for emotional words. Metamemory accuracy across and within the
experimental conditions will be measured, as well as across age groups. JOL accuracy will be
measured using gamma correlations between an item’s given JOL and whether or not it was
recalled.
•

H3: Both younger and older adults’ JOL accuracy will be significantly greater than
chance overall, and within each level of valence and endorsement.
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•

H4: No age deficit in metamemory accuracy is predicted. Both younger and older adults
are predicted to have equally accurate JOLs after accounting for both valence and
endorsement cues.

Age differences in JOL accuracy previously reported for emotional words are predicted
to be eliminated when an additional salient, diagnostic cue is manipulated. It is important to note
that although a null hypothesis is being predicted, this is in line with hypotheses typical of the
aging and metamemory accuracy literature.
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CHAPTER VI
METHOD
Design and Participants
The design was a 2 (Age Group: younger adults, older adults) x 2 (Valence: positive,
neutral) x 2 (Endorsement: yes, no) mixed design with valence and endorsement manipulated
within subjects and age group manipulated between subjects. Fifty-three undergraduate students
enrolled in a psychology course at Mississippi State University were included in the younger
adult condition and awarded course credit in exchange for participating. Older adults included 52
volunteers from the community between the ages of 60 and 85 who were part of a database
maintained by the Eakin lab and were compensated $20.00 for participating. Volunteers were
required to meet the age requirement of 60 or older to be included in the database.
Materials
Emotionally valenced word lists. Prior research indicates that individual participants
consistently rate emotional words incongruently with the ratings provided by normative
databases (Flurry & Eakin, manuscript in preparation). Further, younger and older adults’
normative valence ratings consistently differ for the same words (Grandy et al., 2020). Thus,
discrepancies between normative ratings and individual experience of emotional valence may be
particularly pronounced in memory studies that use word lists normed by younger adults to
examine valence effects for older adults. To the extent that individual experience of valence
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differs from normative ratings, the expected effects in memory, such as the positivity effect, are
less likely to be evidenced when valence is categorized by normative rather than individual
ratings (Flurry & Eakin, manuscript in preparation). To avoid this possibility, individual
experience of valence was accounted for by compiling individualized word lists for each
participant including only positive and neutral words that the participant had previously rated as
such.
An initial list of 100 words—50 assigned normative discrete positive ratings and 50
assigned normative discrete neutral ratings—was created to serve as the master list of words that
all participants rated for valence (See Appendix A). This list contained only words that received
similar normative ratings between the ANEW database (Bradley & Lang, 1999) of ratings made
by younger adults and the EMOTE database of ratings made by older adults. Initially made on a
7-point scale, EMOTE ratings were converted to a 9-point scale to be consistent with ANEW
database ratings which were made on a 9-point scale. Words that received average normalized
ratings falling within the highest one-third of the scale (> 6.0) were classified as positive, and
words falling within the middle one-third of the scale (> 3.0 and < 6.0) were classified as neutral.
Only positive and neutral words that received ratings from both age groups within these
respective ranges for both age groups were included in the word list of potential experimental
words. The list of 100 words was equated between positive and neutral words on length,
concreteness, arousal, word frequency, and relatedness to reduce the effects of additional word
characteristics on memory between positive and neutral words. Further, holding these
characteristics constant was done to reduce potential selection effects between each participant’s
40-word list to be studied. To ensure that the normatively rated list of 50 positive and 50 neutral
words included two distinct levels of valence with no overlap between the two, mean valence
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ratings between positive and neutral words were separated by at least 2 points on the valence
scale. Further, inter-item variability within the two levels of valence was held below 0.5 standard
deviations of the valence scale. This step was taken to ensure the list was made up of positive
and neutral words that did not vary widely in terms of how positive or neutral they were rated
and protect against potential selection effects in which one participant’s 20 positive words could
be much more positive than the next participant’s 20 positive words. The words were to be
presented as part of a category inclusion task in the experiment, therefore each word had one
corresponding category that would be more likely to receive a “yes” than “no” response when
presented together. Each category was also reused once and assigned to a word that would be
more likely to receive a “no” than “yes” response in order to prevent item effects from either
categories or words by counterbalancing whether each word was likely to receive a “yes” vs. a
“no” response.
Normative ratings of valence were collected from individual participant ratings from the
master list done prior to the experiment. From the list of 100 words, an individualized list of 20
positive and 20 neutral words were selected to be studied during the experimental encoding
phase. This step addressed an issue in previous studies that allowed participants to categorize
pre-selected valence individually during the experimental phase (Flurry & Eakin, manuscript in
preparation); participants typically rated more words as positive than neutral. This discrepancy
was especially exaggerated for older adults, who were more likely to focus on positive
information according to the socio-emotional selectivity theory (Charles et al., 2003). Equating
the number of positive and neutral words studied by each participant allowed for more
comparable analyses between measures of recall, JOL magnitude, and JOL accuracy for positive
versus neutral words.
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MMSE. Because age differences in metamemory performance have previously been
attributed to the inclusion of low functioning or cognitively impaired older adults (Eakin et al.,
2014), the Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE; Cockrell & Folstein, 1988) was given to screen
participants for impaired cognitive functioning. The MMSE consists of 30 questions testing
working memory (e.g. remember three words while counting backwards), long-term memory
(e.g. pointing to a watch and asking “what is this?”), and time/place orientation (e.g. what day is
it?). Because the metamemory and aging literature seeks to understand cognitive impairment due
to normal aging, the MMSE is used to screen for impairment due to non-normal aging such as an
accident or degenerative disease. Many of the questions are simple (e.g. “what year is it”),
therefore a high inclusion criterion has typically been placed on MMSE scores in the memory
and aging literature in order to ensure that older adults with significant cognitive impairments are
screened. See Appendix B.
Shipley vocabulary test. The Shipley vocabulary test (Shipley, 1940), a measure of
semantic memory, was administered to both age groups as an additional screening for cognitive
impairment. This test consists of 40 multiple choice questions. A word is presented one at a time
with instructions to choose the most semantically similar word from among four alternatives
(e.g. PARDON; A–FORGIVE, B–POUND, C–DIVIDE, D–TELL). See Appendix C.
Demographic questionnaire. A demographic questionnaire was provided to collect
information about age, education, gender, race, and overall health. Participants typed in age,
education level, gender, and race, and rated overall health on a scale from 1 (poor) to 5 (good).
Older adults must have completed at least a high school education in order to be included.
Exclusion based on this factor was done at recruitment but taking this measure will allow
comparisons between age groups. See Appendix D.
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Inclusion criteria. Younger and older adults were required to be native English speakers,
have at least a high school education, score 28 or above on the MMSE, score above 50% on the
Shipley vocabulary test, and recall at least 7 of 40 words. For older adults, other criteria required
for inclusion were determined at recruitment, including the abilities to read newspaper-sized
print with or without corrected vision, drive oneself to the experiment location, and type on a
computer keyboard. The inclusion criterion for MMSE scores was set to prevent the inclusion of
older adults with cognitive deficits that are not associated with normal aging, and younger adults
who may be indicating inattention, disorientation, or disinterest. The inclusion criterion for the
Shipley vocabulary test was set to prevent the inclusion of participants with verbal deficits and
another test of cognitive functioning because older adults typically outperform younger adults on
vocabulary measures. An inclusion criterion of 7 out of 40 words recalled was established in
order to prevent floor effects in recall from skewing JOL accuracy as measured by gamma
correlations. Gamma correlations measure the correlation of JOL magnitude between recalled
and unrecalled words, therefore an adequate sample of both recalled and unrecalled words is
necessary to examine JOL accuracy.
Procedure. After signing up for the study using the Psychology Research Pool managed
by SONA-systems (https://msstate.sona-systems.com; younger adults) and by agreeing to
participate after a recruitment phone call (older adults), participants were sent a link to an online
survey (Qualtrics, March, 2019) which presented the pre-experimental master word list for
rating. The word list was rated at least 48 hours before the main experiment. Participants of both
age groups viewed the list of 100 normatively rated positive and neutral words; each word was
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presented on the screen one at a time. Participants made discrete, X (negative)2, N (neutral), or P
(positive) valence judgments (EVJs) and then made continuous -100 (completely negative) to 0
(completely neutral) to 100 (completely positive) EVJs for each word. After completing this
task, participants completed the Shipley vocabulary test.
For each participant, the pre-experimental list of 100 words were ranked from most to
least positive on four measures of valence. Words were first ranked by discrete individual
valence ratings as positive or neutral. They were then ranked by continuous individual valence
ratings in order of most positive to least positive rating. Words with the same discrete and
continuous individual valence ratings were then ranked by discrete normative valence ratings.
Words matching on all three of these measures of valence were then ranked by normative
continuous valence ratings. This process created a list of words individually rated as positive or
neutral and then ranked by positivity according to 1) how positive each word was individually
rated, 2) whether it was normatively rated positive or neutral, and then 3) how positive each
word was normatively rated. For each participant, the 20 words assigned individual discrete
positive ratings with the highest individual continuous valence ratings were then selected to be
include in the experimental word list. If less than 20 words were assigned positive individual
discrete ratings, then we selected all words that were discretely rated as positive and
supplemented them by choosing words assigned neutral individual discrete ratings with the most
positive individual continuous ratings until reaching 20 words. Next the 20 most neutral words

Although no negatively normed words were included in the 100 words to be judged, Flurry &
Eakin (unpublished) found that people assign negative judgments to normatively rated neutral
and positive words. Words assigned negative discrete EVJs were eliminated from consideration
to be included in the studied word list in order to prevent words experienced as negative from
interfering with effects between words experienced as positive and neutral.
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were selected by including 20 words assigned neutral individual discrete ratings with the most
neutral individual continuous ratings (closest to 0, either on positive or negative side of scale). If
less than 20 words were assigned neutral individual discrete ratings, then we selected all words
with neutral individual discrete ratings and supplemented them with words assigned positive
individual discrete ratings that had the most neutral individual continuous ratings until reaching
20 words. The result was an experimental list of 40 words that included the 20 most positive and
20 most neutral words according to individual ratings. The 20 positive words were then
randomly assigned to either the “yes” or “no” endorsement condition and counterbalanced by
including 10 categories likely to receive a “yes” response and 10 categories likely to receive a
“no” response when presented in the category inclusion task. The same procedure was completed
for the 20 neutral words to create a list of 40 word-category pairs. After the experimental list was
created for each participant, the word list was entered into an experimental presentation program
using E-Prime presentation software (Schneider et al., 2002), and an individualized program was
created for each participant. Each individualized program varied only on the words and
categories presented in the category inclusion task and was uniform to other participants’
programs in all other aspects.
For the main experiment, participants came to campus to complete the experiment in
person. All instructions were presented on a desktop computer using E-Prime presentation
software (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants were presented with their individualized list of 40
words, 20 of which they had previously rated as positive and 20 of which they had previously
rated as neutral. Each word was presented one at a time, in random order, as part of a category
inclusion task. First, each emotional word was presented on the screen and participants were
instructed to read the word manuscript in preparation for the category inclusion task. Then, a
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category appeared below the presented word. Participants were asked to respond by pressing Y
for “yes” or N for “no” to indicate whether they agreed that the word fit the presented category.
Half of the positive words (e.g. jewel) and neutral words (e.g. shadow) were presented with
categories that are likely to elicit a “yes” response (e.g. JEWEL - “Is a treasure”), and the other
half of each group was presented with categories likely to elicit a “no” response (e.g. JEWEL “Is an intuition”), On the next screen, the emotional word was presented once again without the
category and participants were instructed to read the word in preparation for the JOL.
Details of the encoding procedure were designed to address several prior methodological
issues. Age deficits in metamemory have been attributed to age differences in memory that
degrade the quality of the encoding experience upon which metamemory assessments are made
(Hertzog et al., 2010a). Thus, more total encoding time was provided to older (20s) than
younger (14s) adults in an attempt to equate older adults’ memory performance to a level
comparable to that of younger adults. Each word was first presented on the screen for 3s for
younger adults and 5s for older adults. Next, younger adults had 8s to respond to the category
inclusion task and older adults had 10s to respond. The emotional word was then presented alone
for another 3s and 5s for younger and older adults, respectively. Equating memory performance
between age groups was intended to allow for the examination of age-related deficits in
metamemory in the absence of aging effects on memory performance in order to ensure JOLs
were based on encoding information of a similar quality. Further, this step was meant to
intervene against the potential for floor effects in older adults’ free recall performance and allow
for the examination of JOL accuracy between age groups for a similar number of words within
each level of the valence and endorsement manipulation.
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After each category inclusion task, a new screen appeared asking participants to make a
JOL prediction based on the degree to which they thought they would remember the word
presented at the top of the previous screen on a later test (the actual word did not appear on the
JOL screen). JOLs were made on a continuous scale from 0 (certain you will not recall the word)
to 100 (certain you will recall the word) and were untimed. Here again, consideration was given
to prevent prior methodological concerns in requiring older adults to make JOLs too quickly to
allow them to consider multiple cues, potentially explaining age deficits in metamemory
accuracy reported by studies requiring time-sensitive assessments (Perrotin et al., 2005; Sacher et
al., 2013; Souchay et al., 2000; 2006) versus age equivalence reported by studies providing 20s
or unlimited time to make an assessment (Connor et al., 1997; Eakin & Hertzog, 2006, 2012a;
MacLaverty & Hertzog, 2009). After responding to the category inclusion task and making JOLs
for each word, participants were prompted to press enter to see the next word.
After completing the study-then-JOL process for all 40 words, younger adults completed
the automated Operation Span (OSPAN; Unsworth et al., 2005) task as a filler task for 10
minutes and then younger adults completed the free recall test. In contrast, older adults
completed the free recall test after viewing a series of four instruction screens for approximately
30 seconds each. During the free recall phase, both age groups were instructed to type all the
words they remembered from the study phase, in any order, and they had an unlimited amount of
time to do so. Participants then completed the demographic questionnaire on the computer and
completed the MMSE with the researcher. Participants were thanked for their participation and
assigned credit or monetary compensation.
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
To test for age, valence, and endorsement effects, 2 (Age Group: younger adults, older
adults) X 2 (Valence: positive, neutral) X 2 (Endorsement: yes, no) repeated measures ANOVAs
were conducted on each of the independent variables: free recall, JOL magnitude, and JOL
accuracy. Free recall is the proportion of words correctly recalled from the study phase out of the
total number of words. JOL magnitude was compared to free recall to inform JOL sensitivity.
JOL accuracy was calculated by conducting item-level Goodman-Kruskal Gamma (G)
correlations between JOLs and free recall for each participant. Criterion for significance was set
at p < .05.
A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using JASP (2020; Version
0.14.1) for each of the three dependent variables. In each case, the data was compared to the best
fitting model to determine whether there was strong evidence to accept the null. The best fitting
model always produces a Bayes Factor (BF10) of 1 because the model is always compared to
itself. To determine the BF10 for additional model comparisons, the BF10 for each model
including the added factor was divided by the model without the added factor (Appendix E
shows the model comparison for each Bayes Factor reported). For example the BF10 for the
interaction of valence with age was obtained by dividing the valence + age + valence * age
model by the valence + age model. All calculated Bayes Factors were assessed using a scale
developed by van Doorn et al. (2020).
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Inclusion/Exclusion Results
A total of 52 older adults were tested and 31 were included in the analyses. A total of 98
younger adults were tested and 56 were included in the analyses. Eleven older adult participants
and 31 younger adult participants were removed due to recalling fewer than seven out of the 40
words, or less than 20%. Five older adults and ten younger adults were removed after missing the
MMSE cutoff score of 28/30. Three older adults and one younger adult were removed due to
failure to follow instructions, including using the same discrete valence rating for all words,
preventing any manipulation of valence, or using the same JOL for all words, preventing gamma
correlations from examining variance in JOLs. Two older adults were removed due to
experimenter errors that affected experimental manipulations. Seven older adults and one
younger adult did not complete the Shipley vocabulary test or demographic questionnaire due to
experimenter error, however these eight participants were included in the analyses due to
meeting the inclusion criterion on the MMSE, which served as the primary cognitive screen, and
meeting age requirements at recruitment.
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Table 2
Participants Included in Analyses: Mean Demographic Information, MMSE Scores, and Shipley
Vocabulary Scores
Measure
n
Age
Education (years)
Health (out of 5)

Younger adults
56
18.48 (.1)
12.15(2.28)
2.13 (1.12)

Older adults
31
71.85 (6.68)
17.32 (2.98)
1.81 (.98)

MMSE score
Shipley score (%)

29.12 (0.75)
67.55 (13.6)

29.00 (0.78)
87.93 (.10)

Note. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses

Aim 1
Free recall. In order to determine whether metamemory accuracy was affected by
providing multiple cues, Aim 1 was to determine that both valence and endorsement had an
effect in free recall. To test for these effects, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to
analyze the effects of Age, Valence, and Endorsement on free recall. The means and standard
deviations for free recall are reported in Table 3. We predicted similar free recall between
younger and older adults (H1a) due to methodological considerations made that were intended to
equate memory performance between age groups. The main effect of Age on free recall was not
significant, F(1, 85) = .49, p = .48, ηp2 = .006; younger (M = .29, SE = .01) and older (M = .31,
SE = .02) adults recalled similar proportions of words, overall. The best fitting model to the free
recall data included only Valence plus Endorsement with a Bayes factor (BF10) of 1. A BF10
was calculated to compare a model including Age Group to the null model, resulting in a BF10
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of 0.18, indicating moderate evidence for accepting the null hypothesis that age group had no
effect on free recall.
We predicted higher free recall for positive than neutral words (H1b) and higher free
recall for words assigned “yes” versus “no” responses (H1c). The main effect of Valence was
significant, F(1, 85) = 67.96, p < .01, ηp2= .44; positive words (M = .36, SE = .01) were more
likely to be recalled than neutral words (M = .24, SE = .01). The main effect of Endorsement
also was significant, F(1, 85) = 57.42, p < .01, ηp2= .40; “yes” words (M = .36, SE = .01) words
were more likely to be recalled than neutral words (M = .25, SE = .01 ).
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Table 3
Mean Proportion of Free Recall by Valence, Endorsement, and Age Group
Cue

Age group
Younger adults

Older adults

Positive

.36 (.11)

.37 (.10)

Neutral

.22 (.13)

.25 (.13)

Yes

.34 (.13)

.37 (.13)

No

.25 (.11)

.25 (.10)

Note. Standard errors are provided in parentheses
We predicted no significant interaction between Age Group and Valence or between Age
Group and Endorsement (H1d), indicating a similar effect of the within-subjects variables on
both age groups. The interaction between Age Group and Valence was not significant, F(1, 85) =
.85, p =.36, ηp2= .01. A BF10 of 0.24 indicated moderate evidence for accepting the null that age
did not affect free recall above valence. The interaction between Age Group and Endorsement
was also not significant, F(1, 85) = 1.22, p =.27, ηp2= .01. A BF10 of 0.14 indicated moderate
evidence for accepting the null. Both younger and older adults recalled a similar proportion of
positive and neutral words, and a similar proportion of “yes” and “no” words.
The interaction between Valence and Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 85) = .01, p
= .94, ηp2= .00. A BF10 of 0.19 indicated moderate evidence for accepting the null. The lack of
interaction suggests an additive relationship between Valence and Endorsement. The lack of an
interaction indicates the additive nature of the two factors in terms of contributing to free recall,
creating a stair-step pattern (see Figure 2).
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The three-way interaction between Age, Valence, and Endorsement was not significant,
F(1, 85) = 2.44, p = .12, ηp2= .03, indicating that both age groups demonstrated similar
interaction effects between Valence and Endorsement. A BF10 of 0.02 indicated strong evidence
for accepting the null finding that age group did not affect free recall beyond the effects of the
two factors of Valence and Endorsement.

Figure 2.

Free Recall and JOL Magnitude by Valence-Endorsement Combinations

JOL sensitivity. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to analyze the effects of
Age, Valence, and Endorsement on JOL magnitude as a measure of JOL sensitivity to both
valence and endorsement cues. The mean JOL magnitude and standard deviation for each
condition are reported in Table 4. We predicted no difference in JOL magnitude between age
groups (H2a). The main effect of Age on JOL magnitude was not significant, F(1, 85) = .74, p =
.39, ηp2= .01. Younger (M = 56.66, SE = 2.06) and older (M = 59.62, SE = 2.76) adults made
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similar JOLs overall.Similar to free recall, the best fitting model was one that included the
Valence plus Endorsement, producing a BF10 of 1. A BF10 = 0.19 indicated moderate evidence
in favor of accepting the null that age did not affect JOL sensitivity over and above Valence or
Agreement.
We predicted increased JOL magnitude for positive versus neutral words (H2b) and for
“yes” versus “no” responses (H2c). The main effect of Valence was significant, F(1, 85) =
138.45, p < .01, ηp2= .62; JOLs for positive (M = 65.78, SE = 1.89) words were higher than
JOLs for neutral words (M = 50.50, SE = 1.79). The main effect of Endorsement was significant,
F(1, 85) = 46.52, p < .01, ηp2= .35; “yes” words (M = 62.45, SE = 1.87) received higher JOLs
than “no” words (M = 53.83, SE = 1.79).
Table 4
Mean JOL Magnitude by Valence, Endorsement, and Age Group
Cue

Age group
Younger adults

Older adults

Positive

63.98 (16.13)

66.99 (18.50)

Neutral

48.18 (15.75)

50.93 (16.78)

Yes

61.81 (15.92)

64.16 (19.26)

No

52.03 (15.82)

55.43 (16.05)

Note. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses

The interaction between Valence and Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 85) = 72.65,
p < .01, ηp2= .46. Positive words with “yes” responses (M = 69.52, SE = 2.23) received higher
JOLs than positive words with “no” responses (M = 62.04, SE = 2) or neutral words with “yes”
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responses (M = 55.39, SE = 1.89). Positive words with “no” responses and neutral words with
“yes” responses received higher JOLs than neutral words with “no” responses (M = 45.62, SE =
1.9). A BF10 of 0.18 indicated moderate evidence for accepting this null result. The lack of
interaction suggests an additive relationship between Valence and Endorsement. Similar to the
stair-step pattern in free recall, this pattern of results, shown in Figure 2, suggests that JOLs were
influenced additively by both valence and endorsement cues, providing evidence for multiple cue
use in this study.
We predicted no interaction of age with either valence or endorsement, indicative of
multiple cue use by both age groups (H2d). The interaction between Age Group and Valence on
JOL magnitude was not significant, F(1, 85) = .41, p =.84, ηp2= .00. The BF10 indicating an
interaction of age group with valence was 0.26 providing moderate evidence in favor of
accepting the null result.
The interaction between Age Group and Endorsement on JOL magnitude was also not
significant, F(1, 85) = 1.35, p =.25, ηp2= .02. The BF10 of 0.25 indicated moderate evidence in
favor of accepting the null result. Both younger and older adults gave higher JOLs to positive
than neutral words, and higher JOLs to “yes” than “no” words. The three-way interaction
between Age, Valence, and Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 85) = 1.34, p = .25, ηp2= .016.
The BF10 of 0.02 indicated strong evidence in favor of accepting the null result. Neither age
group demonstrated an interaction effect between Valence and Endorsement on JOL magnitude.
These effects on JOL magnitude tracked the pattern of the effects of Valence and Endorsement
on free recall, suggesting that both younger and older adults’ JOLs were sensitive to the additive
nature of the effects of Valence and Endorsement on recall.
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Aim 2
JOL accuracy. Aim 2 sought to determine whether providing two salient cues would
eliminate age differences in metamemory accuracy for emotional words reported in previous
studies (Flurry & Eakin, unpublished; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Thomas et al., 2011).). JOL
accuracy was measured by calculating gamma correlations between JOLs and free recall
outcomes for each participant. To determine whether JOL accuracy was better than chance, mean
gamma correlations for each group were first analyzed using one-sample t-tests to determine
whether correlations were significantly different from zero. Younger adults’ mean gamma
correlations for all items (M = .27 SE = .03), collapsed across positive, neutral, “yes”, and “no
“words were significantly different from zero, t(55) = 8.65, p < .01). Within each level of
valence and endorsement, younger adults were significantly more accurate than chance for
positive words (M = .28, SE = .04; t(55) = 7.25, p < .01), neutral words (M = .13, SE = .06;
t(52) = 2.32, p < .05), words given “yes” responses (M = .24, SE = .05; t(55) = 4.96, p < .01),
and words given “no” responses (M = .26, SE = .05; t(55) = 5.61, p < .01).
Older adults’ overall mean gamma correlations (M = .29, SE = .05) were also
significantly different from zero, t(30) = 6.25, p < .01), indicating that their predictions were
also significantly more accurate than chance. Older adults were significantly better than chance
for positive words (M = .30, SE = .07; t(30) = 4.31, p < .01), neutral words (M = .27, SE = .07;
t(30) = 3.78, p < .01), words given yes responses (M = .24, SE = .06; t(30) = 3.97, p < .01), and
words given no responses (M = .30, SE = .07; t(30) = 4.56, p < .01). Both younger and older
adults’ mean gamma correlations were significantly better than chance overall, within both
positive and neutral word groups, and within both “yes” and “no” word groups.
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A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to analyze the effects of Age, Valence, and
Endorsement on JOL accuracy using mean gamma correlations as the dependent variable. The
mean gamma correlation and standard deviation for each condition are reported in Table 5. The
main effect of Age on JOL accuracy was not significant, F(1, 64) = 1.10, p = .30, ηp2= .017;
younger (M = .2, SE = .05) and older (M = .28, SE = .06) adults made similarly accurate JOLs.
In this analysis, the best fitting model was the null model indicating that none of the manipulated
factor affected the accuracy scores, with a BF10 of 1. The BF10 for the comparison of age group
to the null model was 0.28 providing moderate evidence in favor of the null model. The main
effect of Valence was not significant, F(1, 64 = 2.92, p = .09, ηp2 = .04; JOL accuracy for
positive (M = .30, SE = .05) words were no more accurate than JOLs for neutral words (M = .18,
SE = .05). However, the BF10 for the comparison of valence to the null model was .80 indicating
weak evidence in favor of accepting the null model that JOLs were equally accurate for positive
and neutral words. This finding was likely produced by the younger adults’ low gamma
correlations for neutral words (see Table 5). The interaction between Age Group and Valence
was not significant, F(1, 64) < .01, p = .90, ηp2= .00 and the BF10 of 0.21 indicated moderate
evidence in favor of the null model.
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Table 5
Mean Gamma Correlations by Valence, Endorsement, and Age Group
Cue

Age group
Younger adults

Older adults

Positive

.28 (.29)

.3 (.39)

Neutral

.13 (.42)

.27 (.39)

Yes

.24 (.35)

.24 (.33)

No

.26 (.34)

.30 (.36)

Note. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. All Gamma correlations significantly greater than
0 (p < .05)

Although we cannot strongly reject the hypothesis that JOL accuracy was significantly
different between valence levels, this hypothesis was not central to our aims in examining JOL
accuracy. Rather, our aims focused on the impact of age on JOL accuracy and we determined
that both younger and older adults made similarly accurate JOLs for positive and neutral words.
The main effect of Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 64) = .72, p =.40, ηp2= .01; “yes”
words (M = .22, SE = .05) words were more likely to be recalled than neutral words (M = .26, SE
= .05 ) and the BF10 for the comparison of endorsement to the null model was 0.20, providing
moderate evidence in favor of the null model. The interaction between Age Group and
Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 64) = .11, .74, ηp2= .002 and the BF10 of 0.19 indicated
moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis that both younger and older adults made
similarly accurate JOLs for both “yes” and “no” words.
The interaction between Valence and Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 64) = .46, p
= .50, ηp2= .01 and the BF10 of 0.27 indicated moderate evidence in favor of the null model.
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JOLs for positive words with “yes” responses (M = .30, SE = .06), positive words with “no”
responses (M = .30, SE = .06), neutral words with “yes” responses (M = .14, SE = .08), and
neutral words with “no” responses (M = .23, SE = .06) were all equally accurate. The three-way
interaction between Age, Valence, and Endorsement was not significant, F(1, 64) = .16, p = .42,
ηp2< .01 and the BF10 of 0.003 indicated strong evidence in favor of the null model. Both age
groups demonstrated a lack of interaction effects between Valence and Endorsement on JOL
accuracy, indicating that JOLs were similarly accurate across all conditions. This pattern of
results suggests that the cues driving JOL accuracy were available regardless of which type of
valence the presented word had, positive or neutral, and whether it was endorsed or not. Accurate
JOLs for neutral-no words with no emotional context or category-word integrated context to
provide cues suggests that these JOLs were either driven by a comparison to previously studied
words that were either positive or endorsed; or that JOLs for neutral-no words were driven by an
alternative cue other than valence or endorsement.
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CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
In the presented experiment, endorsement was provided as a second salient, diagnostic
cue and was predicted to intervene against the cue overshadowing effects of valence on
metamemory accuracy which produced age deficits in metamemory accuracy previously
obtained when manipulating valence alone (Flurry & Eakin, unpublished; Tauber & Dunlosky,
2012; Thomas et al., 2011). Age differences were predicted to be ameliorated under conditions
that facilitated multiple cue use by providing a second salient cue. More importantly, the findings
could inform the larger literature addressing the debate about age effects in metamemory
accuracy by providing support for the alternative explanation that age differences in
metamemory that have been obtained because of experimental conditions that create cue
overshadowing effects or hinder multiple cue use by older adults.
Aim 1
Aim 1 was to determine whether older adults can use multiple cues to inform JOLs for
emotional words by examining JOL sensitivity to both endorsement and valence factors. To
make this determination, endorsement first had to be established as a diagnostic and salient cue
when manipulated alongside valence for both younger and adults by examining whether both age
groups demonstrated endorsement effects in free recall and JOL sensitivity. Endorsement had
previously been shown to impact memory for younger adults (Craik & Tulving, 1975); however,
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no studies were found showing an endorsement effect in memory for older adults. In order to
serve as a basis of metamemory predictions that would be diagnostic of memory, memory had to
be affected by both valence and endorsement. Previously reported emotional salience effects and
endorsement effects were replicated in which younger and older adults recalled more positive
than neutral words and more “yes” than “no” words. The presented study establishes
endorsement effects in older adults, indicating that the memory-benefitting integration process
described by Craik and Tulving (1975) is not affected by age. In addition, these results indicate
that both valence and endorsement impacted memory and that cues based on either valence or
endorsement would be diagnostic of memory.
Further, both age groups demonstrated a stair-step pattern in the interaction of valence
and endorsement on free recall (see Figure 2). This pattern is suggestive of an additive effect of
valence and endorsement factors on recall, in which memory was best for positive-yes words,
worse for neutral-yes words and positive-no words, and worst for neutral words with “no”
responses (neutral-no). Emotional salience effects are explained in the literature such that
positive words provide more information due to an additional emotional context that neutral
words lack (Charles et al., 2003). Endorsement effects are explained such that “yes” endorsed
words provide more information by creating an integrated unit between the word and the context
of the question the “yes” or “no” response refers to, whereas such integration is lacking for “no”
responses (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Thus, positive-yes words would provide the most
information or context, positive-no and neutral-yes words would provide a smaller but equal
amount of information, and neutral-no words provide the least. Results from the interaction of
valence and endorsement on free recall in the presented study indicate that these factors had an
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additive effect on memory in which participants were more likely to recall words that fell in the
level of each factor that provided the most information at encoding.
In addition to demonstrating memory effects, JOLs had to be shown to be sensitive to
both factors because the hypothesis that older adults would demonstrate age equivalence in JOL
accuracy was conditional upon their JOLs being sensitive to both manipulated cues. The second
part of Aim 1 was to determine whether JOLs for both younger and older adults were sensitive to
both the emotional valence, which had been previously shown (Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010;
Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Flurry & Eakin, unpublished), and to endorsement manipulations,
which had not been previously shown in the literature. Both younger and older adults gave JOLs
that were sensitive to both the valence and endorsement effects in memory. They gave higher
JOLs to positive than to neutral words and also assigned higher JOLs to “yes” than to “no”
words. These JOL sensitivity results showed that JOLs of both younger and older adults were
sensitive to multiple cues in the same experiment, indicating that the manipulation of
endorsement alongside valence provided an additional salient cue to support metamemory
accuracy for emotional words.
Not only did both age groups’ JOLs track the main effects of valence and endorsement on
memory, but they also tracked the additive stair-step pattern in memory by assigning the highest
JOLs to positive-yes responses, lower JOLs to neutral-yes responses and positive-no responses,
and the lowest JOLs to neutral-no words (See Figure 2). Similar to memory, these results are
indicative of an additive effect of valence and endorsement cues on JOL magnitude that provides
strong evidence of multiple cue use by both age groups. JOL sensitivity results in which JOLs
are higher for “yes” words and lower for “no” words could still have been obtained if the
endorsement effect on JOL magnitude was mediated entirely by valence. However, if that were
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the case, we would have expected higher JOLs for positive-no words than for neutral-yes words,
no difference between positive-yes and positive-no words, and no difference between neutral-yes
and neutral-no words. Thus, the obtained stair-step pattern in both free recall and JOL magnitude
demonstrates JOL sensitivity to both valence and endorsement cues, providing evidence of
multiple cue use for emotional words by both age groups.
Despite evidence of multiple cue use from JOL sensitivity to both valence and
endorsement cues, we still do not know how multiple types of cues were used to make each
judgment. Koriat’s cue-utilization framework (1997) identified mnemonic cues as experiencebased nonanalytic heuristics in which predictions are informed by internal experience. These
heuristics were distinguished from theory-based analytic inferences in which metamemory
predictions are informed by inferences about how intrinsic cues such as item characteristics or
extrinsic cues such as encoding conditions affect memory. Koriat et al. (2004) demonstrated that
JOLs were insensitive to retention interval, an extrinsic cue, suggesting that people may not
spontaneously use theory-based cues, and that experience-based mnemonic cues may
overshadow theory-based intrinsic or extrinsic cues. In contrast, Mueller et al., (2016) reported
that JOLs for identical (dog–dog) versus related pairs (dog–cat) were made primarily based on
theories or beliefs about which would benefit memory rather than on an experience-based cue of
encoding fluency. It is unclear whether participants in this dissertation were combining valence
and endorsement cues based on theory-based inferences about how each factor benefited
memory or whether multiple cue use was primarily driven by an experience-based mnemonic
cue, such as encoding fluency or accessibility, and only indirectly informed by valence and
endorsement cues.
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Accessibility is the amount of information retrieved at the time an assessment about
memory is made and has been put forth by Koriat’s (1993) accessibility model as a mnemonic
cue that could explain how accurate metamemory assessments can be made without direct access
to the memory trace. ERP data has demonstrated that JOLs were based on another mnemonic
cue, encoding fluency (Undorf et al., 2020). Encoding fluency could explain endorsement effects
in our study to the extent that “yes” words were processed more quickly than “no” words.
However, the relationship between fluency and valence effects is less clear and fluency has been
shown to have little influence on JOLs (Mueller et al., 2016). A mnemonic cue such as
accessibility may explain JOL sensitivity to both valence and endorsement if JOLs were higher
for positive than neutral, and “yes” versus “no” words simply because the additional emotional
context of positive words and the integrated unit created for “yes” words brought more
information to mind than neutral or “no” words that lacked additional context.
Another question informing this discussion is whether JOLs are being made
comparatively between items or being made based only on information available from the
studied word. Concluding that multiple cue use in this study relied primarily on the combination
of intrinsic and extrinsic cues to inform JOLs requires two assumptions that are not required by a
conclusion that JOLs were primarily informed by a mnemonic cue. Thus, JOL magnitude and
accuracy results in the current study may be most parsimoniously explained by Koriat’s (1993)
accessibility model. Manipulating two cues in the presented study allowed these assumptions to
be investigated by comparing the additive effect of valence and endorsement between free recall,
JOL magnitude, and JOL accuracy results. If participants in the presented study relied on theorybased inferences when making JOLs, their sensitivity to valence and endorsement may be
explained by theories that positive words and “yes” words were more likely to benefit memory
63

than neutral words and “no” words. For the same explanation to apply to the additive effect of
valence and endorsement, however, would require the combination of both cues to make a single
theory-based inference. Participants would need to conclude that positive-yes words deserved the
highest JOLs, because they thought the additive effect of the positive context of the word and
integrated context of saying “yes” to the question-word pair would benefit their memory the
most. However, this calculation would require an understanding of each factor and their effects
on memory that is unlikely for participants, perhaps even memory researchers, to possess. In
order to conclude that the additive effect of valence endorsement on JOL magnitude was
obtained based on multiple theory-based cues, we must make an initial assumption that
participants had theories about the additive effects of these factors. A more parsimonious
explanation of the results, and the explanation I propose, is that this stair-step pattern is
indicative of the influence of accessibility on JOLs, such that the highest JOLs are given to
words that bring to mind the most information—positive-yes—and the lowest JOLs are given to
words that bring to mind the least information, neutral-no. Positive-no and neutral-yes words
received similar JOLs that were lower than positive-yes and higher than neutral-no. Participants
judged positive-no and neutral-yes words as equally memorable considering that neither of the
cues increased JOL magnitude relative to the other. One might conclude from these results that
multiple cue use must involve participants comparing the perceived memory benefit of valence
and endorsement cues to determine that they deserve similar JOLs. However, Koriat’s (1993)
accessibility model provides an explanation for these results without making assumptions about
participants’ ability to weigh multiple theory-based inferences, or about the comparative nature
of JOLs. Under this interpretation, even after manipulating multiple factors, JOLs may have been
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only indirectly influenced by valence and endorsement and more directly influenced by the
amount of information brought to mind for positive versus neutral, and “yes” versus “no” words.
Attributing multiple cue use in our study to a combination of theory-based inferences also
requires a second assumption that JOLs are made comparatively between the studied word and
previously studied words, rather than being made based only on information available from the
studied word. For example, neutral words may provide no context of emotional valence unless
compared to a previously studied positive word. Only through this comparison would a relatively
lower JOL be made for the neutral word based on the theory that emotional context benefits
memory. This view is seemingly taken by Koriat (1993) in saying that in addition to considering
the amount of information, or accessibility, people “pit different clues against each other and
make deliberate, educated inferences about plausibility of retrieval”. It is unclear whether
valence and endorsement cues in this dissertation were only available when assessing memory
for positive and “yes” words or also considered for neutral words and “no” words. Results from
Flurry and Eakin (unpublished) demonstrating impaired JOL accuracy within neutral words
suggested that, rather than JOLs for neutral words being made lower due to a comparison to
positive words, perhaps a lack of available information or diagnostic signal for neutral words
impaired JOL accuracy for these items. Thus, rather than being comparative between items, a
second possibility may be that JOLs are determined by the presence or absence of a signal from
the cues that are present for each individual word. This noncomparative explanation would be
consistent with Nelson & Dunlosky’s (1991) monitoring-dual-memories explanation of
improved JOL accuracy for immediate for delayed JOLs that immediate JOLs are dominated by
information in short-term memory rather than long-term memory. Such an influence of shortterm memory makes JOLs less accurate than delayed JOLs that are dominated by information in
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long-term memory and would also make comparisons across previously studied words less
impactful on JOLs.
If JOLs are not comparative and instead rely only on a signal from presently available
cues, there should have been no valence or endorsement cues available to inform JOLs for
neutral-no words, perhaps reducing JOL accuracy because only non-diagnostic cues were
available. In this case we would expect the same stair-step pattern observed in recall and JOL
magnitude (see Figure 2) to be observed in JOL accuracy: highest for positive-yes words in
which both valence and endorsement cues were available, lower for positive-no and neutral-yes
words with no significant difference between the two, and lowest JOL accuracy for neutral-no
words that provided no valence or endorsement signal. This additive effect would indicate that
participants were better able to use multiple cues to make accurate JOLs when receiving either
additional context from a “positive” signal, “yes” signal, or both. Alternatively, JOLs should be
similarly accurate across all four valence-endorsement combinations if made comparatively by
giving higher JOLs to “yes” words that were more positive, or lower JOLs to “no” words that
were less positive, than previously studied words. Neutral-no words should provide just as many
cues as positive-yes words if based on a comparison, rather than only the cues available from the
neutral-no word.
As will be presented in the Aim 2 discussion next, our results indicating that JOLs were
equally accurate for all pairings supports a view that any theory-based inferences about multiple
cues were made comparatively across items. Participants were able to make accurate JOLs in the
neutral-no condition in which no valence or endorsement cues were immediately available
suggesting that any theory-based inferences must have been made based on a comparison to
previously studied positive or “yes” words that did provide immediately available diagnostic
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cues. However, between-item comparisons are not possible for the first word on a list and
random selection could have presented multiple words of the same category before a comparison
was available. Thus, unless serial position effects were evident in which JOL accuracy is initially
poor for neutral-no words and increases as more comparisons become available, at least some
JOLs must have been made accurately based only on available cues. One way to examine this is
to look at serial position effect to determine if JOLs were less accurate for neutral-no words
studied earlier in presentation order than for neutral-no words presented later. If no serial
position effect is obtained, the initial JOLs would have had to have been based on cues that are
diagnostic even when no comparisons are available. Accessibility remains as a possible
mnemonic cue that could have been relied upon to make accurate judgments when the presented
word produced no salient cues in short term memory to make inferences based on valence or
endorsement factors alone. Participants could have made accurate JOLs in the absence of either
cue by assigning lower JOLs to neutral-no words based only on lower accessibility or less
information brought to mind. Thus, accessibility-based JOLs would have been expected to be
accurate for neutral-no words regardless of whether made comparatively or made based on a lack
of information or signal, whereas theory-based JOLs would only be accurate for neutral-no
words when made comparatively.
In sum, if JOLs were based on theory-based intrinsic and extrinsic cues in the presented
study, the obtained stairstep patterns of valence and endorsement on JOL magnitude and JOL
accuracy would have required both assumptions that participants had theories about the additive
effect of valence and endorsement and that JOLs were made comparatively. On the other-hand,
accessibility-based JOLs could have produced the stair-step pattern without any theories of
additive valence and endorsement effects and would have been accurate regardless of whether
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made comparatively or based only on available cues. Bypassing these assumptions increases the
explanatory power of Koriat’s (1993) accessibility model in which the amount of information
brought to mind at study is predictive of both JOL magnitude and recall, consequently leading to
accurate JOLs regardless of whether made comparatively or not. These distinctions are subtle
and deserve further examination; however, together they highlight the accessibility model as a
robust and comprehensive theory potentially explaining how multiple cues are combined to make
accurate JOLs.
Concluding that JOLs were primarily influenced by accessibility may be interpreted by
some as evidence that theory-based cues are unnecessary to explain JOLs and JOL accuracy.
However, people have demonstrated the ability to predict others’ memory performance,
suggesting that JOLs must be informed to an extent by shared information about items or study
conditions that is unrelated to individual experience (Lovelace, 1984; Hertzog et al., 2002).
Future studies may shed light on how multiple theory-based and experience-based cues are
combined by examining JOLs made for others’ memory, which are presumably made in the
absence of experience-based cues. Further, if JOLs were primarily influenced by accessibility,
this explanation may be interpreted as using a single cue and thus negating the impact of
overshadowing effects of additional cues on JOL accuracy. However, Koriat’s (1997) cueutilization framework illustrates that multiple intrinsic and extrinsic cues indirectly influence
JOLs through mnemonic cues (see Figure 1). Even when JOLs are directly influenced only by a
single mnemonic cue such as accessibility, overshadowing effects may still occur in the presence
of a salient cue, such as valence, to the extent that more salient cues are more accessible and
bring to mind more information. People may give higher JOLs for positive words because they
bring to mind more information, without knowing why such a factor affects memory, but if
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additional factors that impact memory equally are not also equally influencing JOLs, JOLs will
be inaccurate for having failed to account for the additional factor. For example, Flurry &
Eakin’s (unpublished) older adults could have demonstrated JOL sensitivity to valence just by
giving higher JOLs to positive words and lower JOLs to neutral words even if only directly
influenced by accessibility. However, if accessibility was only influenced by the salient valence
cue, their older adults’ JOL accuracy could have been poor because factors other than valence
were impacting memory without being accounted for by JOLs. When provided an additional cue
of endorsement, older adults in the current study may have made accurate JOLs for emotional
words because both of the factors driving memory were also indirectly influencing JOLs through
a mnemonic cue such as accessibility. Thus, multiple cue use is still likely to be critical to older
adults’ ability to make accurate JOLs, even if JOLs are primarily driven by a single mnemonic
cue. Aim 2 tested whether metamemory accuracy for emotional words was impacted by a
manipulation of multiple cues.
Aim 2
Finding age invariance in memory and metamemory sensitivity to both factors was
necessary but not sufficient to demonstrate the lack of an age deficit in metamemory. Though
important to our conclusions, sensitivity as a metamemory measure is a blunt instrument and
does not demonstrate that metamemory predictions were accurate at the item level. The focus of
Aim 2 was to determine whether metamemory accuracy was equivalent for younger and older
adults when multiple salient cues were available.
Metamemory accuracy is evaluated by correlating JOLs and memory outcomes at the
item level to determine whether a word that received a higher JOL was also more likely to be
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recalled. Accuracy measures do not provide any information regarding magnitude of
metamemory judgments, including whether judgments were under- or over-confident, but rather
whether each item received a JOL that was correlated with its memory outcome. Mean gamma
correlations for younger and older age groups can then be compared against zero to determine if
their JOLs were better than chance, as well as compared between age groups to determine
whether younger and older adults’ JOLs were equally accurate. As predicted by the hypotheses
of Aim 2, no age differences were obtained in JOL accuracy when two salient cues were
provided as the potential basis of metamemory predictions. One-sample t-tests indicated that
both younger and older adults provided JOLs that were better than chance in terms of accuracy
across all valence and endorsement conditions. This finding demonstrates that both younger and
older adults were making systematic, discriminate JOLs in response to the manipulated variables
rather than producing JOLs at random. Repeated-measures ANOVAs indicating null effects of
age on JOL accuracy across and within valence and endorsement levels were further supported
by Bayesian mixed factor ANOVA testing.
These findings demonstrate that age did not impact JOL accuracy in this study. Not only
did accuracy not vary with experimental condition—accuracy was similar for “yes” and “no”
endorsements and for positive and neutral words, though the null model was only weakly
supported versus the valence model —they also did not interact with age. This finding is
important because age differences reported in previous studies examining metamemory for
emotional words were primarily within levels of emotional valence. Both Tauber & Dunlosky
(2012) and Flurry & Eakin (unpublished) reported no age differences when examining overall
JOL accuracy across all levels of valence; however, Tauber & Dunlosky’s (2012) older adults
were inaccurate when predicting memory for neutral words in a list of positive and neutral
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words, and in a list of positive, neutral, and negative words, whereas Flurry & Eakin’s
(unpublished) older adults gave inaccurate JOLs for positive words in a list of positive and
neutral words. Paired with no age differences in JOL sensitivity to emotional valence, these
results suggest that older adults were able to make overall accurate JOLs by giving higher JOLs
to positive words and lower JOLs to neutral words, but after using valence as a cue to inform
their JOLs, older adults were unable to use additional cues to discriminate within each level of
valence which words they were more or less likely to recall. In the current study, both age
groups’ JOLs were significantly more accurate than chance within each condition and no age
differences were obtained. Previously reported age differences in metamemory accuracy for
emotional words were not replicated here when an additional salient, diagnostic cue was
manipulated; suggesting that previously reported age differences in metamemory accuracy for
emotional words (Flurry & Eakin, unpublished; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Thomas et al., 2011)
may have been due to cue overshadowing effects in which emotional valence overshadowed
other cues that could have been diagnostic of memory. Age differences under conditions that
induce overshadowing effects should not be attributed to an overall inability of older adults to
use multiple cues or to make accurate JOLs; rather, the age effects in metamemory may be
primarily due to overshadowing by a single cue that is particularly salient to older adults.
In addition to supporting previous literature indicating that older adults can use multiple
cues to make accurate metamemory assessments (Hertzog et al., 2002; Hertzog et al., 2010b;
Hines et al., 2015), this dissertation establishes that older adults can use multiple cues to work
against cue overshadowing effects and improve JOL accuracy in the presence of a salient cue.
Hertzog et al. (2002) established that older adults use multiple cues by examining privileged
access in addition to the manipulated cue of relatedness. However, this analysis did not
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manipulate any factors to potentially be used as cues and did not identify what cues were being
used. Hines et al. (2015) established that older adults can use multiple cues by examining
mnemonic cues such as memory for past test performance and recognition fluency but also did
not manipulate any known diagnostic factors. To our knowledge, Hertzog et al. (2010b) is the
only study that manipulated more than one factor to determine whether older adults could
account for multiple cues. Hertzog et al. (2010b) established that older adults could make
accurate JOLs using both an intrinsic cue of relatedness and an extrinsic cue of strategy use. This
dissertation supports these results and further demonstrates that older adults can use an extrinsic
cue to make accurate JOLs and overcome cue overshadowing effects in the presence of a
particularly salient intrinsic cue such as emotional valence. These studies provide evidence that
Koriat’s cue-utilization theory accounting for the use of intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic cues
extends to the older adult population and that the mechanisms influencing JOLs work similarly
across the lifespan.
If age differences in metamemory for emotional words can be explained by
overshadowing effects in the presence of a salient cue, perhaps reported age differences in
episodic metamemory should also be attributed to conditions and methodologies that led to cue
overshadowing effects and hindered the use of multiple cues. For example, age differences in
metamemory for cue-target pairs reported by Souchay et al. (2000) may have been due to
potential overshadowing effects by cue familiarity and exacerbated by methods such as only
providing 5 seconds to make an assessment and using a discrete yes/no scale. The Souchay et al.
(2000) study is just one example among studies with similar methods and results (Souchay et al.,
2006; Perrotin et al., 2005) highlighting how factors and methodological conditions could have
hindered multiple cue use by older adults. Thus, conditions that differentially affected one age
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group may have produced the reported age differences in metamemory, suggesting they may be a
phenomenon of researcher constraints rather than deficits due to aging participants. Rather than
using reported age differences in episodic metamemory to dismiss the bulk of the literature
demonstrating no detrimental effects of aging on metamemory processes, I propose an
alternative explanation to these findings: Methodological constraints and subsequent cue
overshadowing effects impaired multiple cue use by older adults, producing spurious age
differences in episodic metamemory rather than evidence of true age deficits.
Rather than continue the methodological sparring to explain inconsistent aging effects on
metamemory accuracy, this dissertation sought to determine whether there was a cognitive
mechanism underlying the inconsistent results that is differentially impacted by age under some
conditions and unaffected by age under other conditions. The results from this experiment
suggest that multiple cue use could be one such mechanism underlying age differences in
metamemory. These results indicate that when methodological procedures such as including
cognitively impaired older adults, requiring time-constrained metamemory assessments made on
a discrete scale, or manipulating a single salient factor such as emotional valence hinders
multiple cue use, metamemory accuracy is also likely to be impaired. In fact, a comparison of
studies that reported age differences versus studies reporting age equivalence in the literature can
be divided into studies whose conditions impaired multiple cue use versus studies with
conditions facilitating multiple cue use (see Table 1).
One might argue that if these conditions hinder multiple cue use, they should have also
impaired multiple cue use by younger adults. However, multiple cue use may be differentially
affected by methods that place additional burden on cognitive processes with well-known age
deficits such as working memory (Craik et al., 1990; Ferguson et al., 1992) or inhibition (Hasher
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& Zacks, 1988). Considering the general slowing hypothesis (Salthouse, 1996), time-constrained
metamemory judgments may differentially reduce the amount of time older adults have to
consider multiple cues to inform each judgment, and age-related working memory deficits may
reduce the amount of information available to consider. Further, after deciding on a “yes” or
“no” FOK, discrete assessment scales allowed no scale variability to distinguish any further
gradation of how likely or unlikely they were to recall the item, perhaps making older adults less
likely to inhibit the most salient cue and consider additional diagnostic cues. Therefore,
providing older adults with a single salient cue and minimal scale variability, requiring speeded
metamemory assessments, and including cognitively impaired older adults with lower working
memory and frontal lobe functioning may have limited older adults’ ability to use multiple cues
in these studies. If this is the case, these age differences should be attributed to the previously
known age-related deficits cited above, rather than concluding that there is a new age deficit in
episodic metamemory.
By comparing methodological differences without considering how methods may affect
multiple cue use, the literature may be overlooking the root of the problem. My stance is that
multiple cue use, a mechanism necessary for accurate assessments, was disadvantaged for older
adults in studies reporting age differences in metamemory and that conclusions about the effects
of normal aging on metamemory processes should be drawn primarily from studies that do not
differentially impair this mechanism for one of its subject groups. Results from the current study
confirm the hypothesis that older adults can use multiple cues to make accurate metamemory
assessments, even for salient information like emotional words, when provided with conditions
that do not impede multiple cue use.
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Limitations
This study demonstrated that age differences in metamemory for emotional words may be
explained by age differences in multiple cue use. One factor limiting this conclusion is that this
study only examined metamemory using JOLs, an encoding-based assessment. This decision was
made in order to remain consistent with previous studies examining metamemory for emotional
words (Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). However, the use of JOLs
prevents direct comparison to much of the aging and metamemory literature examining age
differences in metamemory using retrieval-based FOKs (Eakin and Hertzog, 2006, 2012a; Eakin
et al., 2014; MacLaverty & Hertzog, 2009; Morson et al., 2015; Perrotin et al., 2005; Souchay et
al., 2000; 2006; Thomas et al., 2011). Previous studies have indicated that the JOLs and FOKs
rely on different processes (Souchay et al., 2004) and that age differences in metamemory are
more likely to be obtained in assessments reliant on retrieval-based processes such as FOKs
(Souchay et al., 2000). Recent research suggests that encoding and retrieval may be separate
mechanisms (McDonough et al., 2021) potentially allowing for differential effects of age
between the two mechanisms. Examining whether the effects reported in the presented study are
also obtained using an FOK paradigm would strengthen conclusions of no age deficits in
episodic metamemory and also allow more direct conclusions to be made on the influence of
accessibility on multiple cue use.
Due to emotional valence’s high salience and unique relationship with aging in instances
of negativity and positivity bias, the conclusions of this study about multiple cue use may only
apply to studies manipulating a particular type of cue. Thus, these conclusions may not
generalize to studies that do not manipulate valence or present salient intrinsic cues that may be
more likely to induce cue overshadowing. Further, we did not directly demonstrate cue
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overshadowing effects by valence or endorsement cues. These results may have been
strengthened by including conditions in which only one cue—valence or endorsement—was
manipulated in order to demonstrate cue overshadowing effects in the same experiment. Other
cue manipulations should be explored to determine whether age differences reported in the
metamemory literature, such as age differences using paradigms that allow for overshadowing
due to cue familiarity, for example, (Souchay et al., 2000; Morson et al., 2015; Perrotin et al.,
2005), would also be eliminated by manipulating a second salient cue. If the present study’s
findings do not extend beyond studies examining metamemory for emotional words, then the
multiple cue use demonstrated by older adults may be limited to improving JOL accuracy in the
presence of a salient cue, or exclusively for emotional material. If emotional valence is found to
be unique, this may be explained by effects such as positivity bias that reflect differential
processing of emotional information that may be more likely to lead to cue overshadowing
effects.
Although this study answers questions about younger and older adults’ ability to use
multiple cues, it introduces many questions about how these cues interact. Cue characteristics
such as cue salience or cue type could influence how they are combined with other cues to make
JOLs. Conclusions drawn from this study using an intrinsic cue, emotional valence, and an
extrinsic cue, endorsement, may not generalize to studies manipulating two intrinsic cues, two
mnemonic cues, or various other combinations of cue types. This dissertation demonstrates that
younger and older adults can use multiple intrinsic and extrinsic cues together to make accurate
JOLs, however these results may not generalize to other combinations of cue types.
The current study is also limited in that measures of working memory and frontal lobe
functioning were not included. Although the MMSE served as proxy for these measures by
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screening out participants with potential deficits in these areas, directly measuring these could
provide data reflecting individual differences in these cognitive processes that may be
influencing multiple cue use and/or JOL accuracy. For example, poor JOL accuracy for
participants with low working memory scores regardless of age would reflect that poor working
memory is leading to an inability to use multiple cues rather than aging. However, at two parts
totaling two hours, the lengthy nature of this study did not allow us to administer additional
assessments for working memory and frontal lobe functioning.
Future Directions
Further work is needed to determine how people use multiple cues, how this process is
affected by age, and how multiple cue use and aging interact to impact metamemory accuracy.
An initial follow-up to this study should examine whether older adults can similarly use multiple
cues to make FOKs for emotional information. This follow-up would allow the conclusion of no
age differences in episodic metamemory to be generalized to retrieval-based assessments. In
order to address the limitation of cue type, another follow-up to this study should be to determine
whether age differences in metamemory obtained when manipulating factors other than
emotional valence can also be eliminated by manipulating a second salient and diagnostic cue. If
manipulating a second cue in studies reporting age differences in metamemory accuracy
produces age equivalent JOL accuracy in studies would indicate that impaired multiple cue use is
not just negatively impacting older adults’ metamemory accuracy for emotional words but could
also be contributing to age differences in metamemory accuracy throughout the literature.
Additionally, much work is needed to parse out the effects of methodological conditions
on multiple cue use for both younger and older adults. This study should also be followed up
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with studies examining the effects of timing-constraints and discrete vs. continuous scale type on
multiple cue use and JOL accuracy between age groups. Questions about how people use
multiple cues can be addressed by isolating methodological decisions such as timing and scale
type for metamemory assessments to determine how they affect multiple cue use, and thus
metamemory accuracy. A follow up study should examine whether younger adults consider
multiple cues to the same extent when forced to make speeded predictions and whether this
affects their JOL accuracy. Examining both younger and older age groups may then allow us to
determine the extent to which younger and older adults’ ability to use multiple cues may be
differentially impacted under task conditions that do and do not impede multiple cue use. To
examine the effect on aging on this relationship, another experiment should examine whether
older adults are more susceptible to cue overshadowing or poor JOL accuracy when they make
speeded metamemory predictions versus when they can make predictions at their own pace. A
similar aging paradigm should be used to determine how a discrete versus continuous scale
impacts multiple cue use and both FOK and JOL accuracy for younger and older adults.
Answering these questions will advance the literature by providing common ground from which
methodological decisions can be made to examine age effects on metamemory without impeding
multiple cue use.
Further work is also required to understand the extent to which individual differences and
age differences in other cognitive mechanisms contribute to multiple cue use. If possible, follow
up studies should include measures of working memory and frontal lobe functioning or
inhibition to examine the extent to which potential individual differences these processes explain
variance in JOL accuracy. These measures may then be controlled for to determine whether
differences in JOL accuracy were explained primarily by either of these processes. Age
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comparisons can also be made using these measures; however, we would expect that age
differences in multiple cue use and JOL accuracy would be partially explained by established
age-related deficits in working memory and inhibition (Craik et al., 1990; Ferguson et al., 1992;
Hasher & Zacks, 1988).
Another follow up to this study could add to the literature by asking participants to make
JOLs for others’ memory when multiple cues are manipulated. This method has been used to
demonstrate the influence of intrinsic cues on metamemory (Koriat & Ackerman, 2010), and to
determine whether privileged access indicates that multiple cues are being used (Hertzog, 2002).
Asking participants to assess whether someone else will remember words that are manipulated
on multiple variables such as emotional valence and endorsement could demonstrate the use of
multiple intrinsic cues. If participants demonstrate JOL sensitivity to valence and endorsement in
JOLs made for others’ memory, this finding would indicate that theory-based intrinsic cues are
informing multiple cue use. However, if JOLs are only sensitive to these variables for their own
memory, and not in JOLs made for others, this finding would suggest that emotional valence and
endorsement were more likely contributing to experience-based mnemonic cues such as
accessibility. In this case, although JOLs were sensitive to multiple cues, they might have been
driven by a single experience-based cue such as accessibility, which has been moderated by the
manipulated factors of emotional valence and endorsement.
Conclusion
This study demonstrated that older adults can make accurate JOLs by using multiple cues
to account for multiple diagnostic factors manipulated by researchers. Supporting multiple cue
use by manipulating an additional salient cue eliminated overshadowing effects and previously
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reported age differences in metamemory for emotional words. The implications of these results,
however, extend beyond providing a method to fix potentially phenomenological instances of
age differences in metamemory for emotional words. By identifying a cognitive mechanism—
multiple cue use—that may be differentially impaired for older versus younger adults under
conditions that manipulate a single salient cue, an alternative explanation is provided for age
differences reported throughout the episodic metamemory literature. Studies reporting age
differences in episodic metamemory provided conditions that differentially impaired multiple
cue use for older adults by providing insufficient time and an inadequate scale with which to
account for multiple cues. This study reveals a potential discrepancy between the metamemory
performance older adults are capable of under conditions that enable multiple cue use, and
results obtained under conditions that impede multiple cue use. This discrepancy may explain a
rift in the metamemory and aging literature regarding the effect of age on metamemory,
providing a direction for future research to establish the effects of various methodological
considerations on each of the processes that impact metamemory, beginning with multiple cue
use. Establishing a more consistent methodology based on theoretically driven decisions about
how methods affect processes such as multiple cue use can provide this literature with the
common ground to support a concurrent conclusion on the impact of aging on episodic
metamemory.
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APPENDIX A
MASTER WORD LIST AND SAMPLE PARTICIPANT WORD LIST
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Table A1
Word

Master Word List
Normative valence

Normative

Positive/Neutral

valence rank

YES category

NO category

order
champion

p

1

is a competitor

is a service

excellence

p

2

is a quality

is a souvenir

cash

p

3

is an asset

is a timeframe

success

p

4

is an aspiration

is a smell

baby

p

5

is a youth

is a rivalry

promotion

p

6

is a milestone

is an electronic

vacation

p

7

is a luxury

is a chemical

music

p

8

is an expression

is a ship

beach

p

9

is a landform

is a relationship

diploma

p

10

is an achievement

is a sea

acceptance

p

11

is a decision

is a plant

liberty

p

12

is a right

is an occupation

diamond

p

13

is a gift

is a notion

pillow

p

14

is a comfort

is an affliction

achievement

p

15

is a goal

is a mammal

wedding

p

16

is a custom

is an athlete

beauty

p

17

is a perspective

is a slope

truth

p

18

is an absolute

is a place

trophy

p

19

is an incentive

is a light
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Table A1 (continued)
Word

Normative valence

Normative

Positive/Neutral

valence rank

YES category

NO category

desire

p

20

is a feeling

is a privilege

honor

p

21

is a virtue

is a liquid

leader

p

22

is a role

is an event

knowledge

p

23

is an understanding

is a figure

spouse

p

24

is a relation

is an atom

fireworks

p

25

is a demonstration

is a flavor

angel

p

26

is an entity

is a waterway

reward

p

27

is a motivation

is a season

applause

p

28

is a compliment

is a field

heart

p

29

is an organ

is a platform

bath

p

30

is a relaxation

is a loss

star

p

31

is a luminary

is a drink

cake

p

32

is a treat

is a defense

sleep

p

33

is a need

is an invention

palace

p

34

is a residence

is a language

dinner

p

35

is a fulfillment

is an illusion

earth

p

36

is an ecosystem

is a favor

exercise

p

37

is an action

is a color

snow

p

38

is a hazard

is a meat

ambition

p

39

is a drive

is a brand

jewel

p

40

is a treasure

is an intuition

girl

p

41

is a description

is a sound
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Table A1 (continued)
Word

Normative valence

Normative

Positive/Neutral

valence rank

YES category

NO category

movie

p

42

is a creation

is a species

intellect

p

43

is an attribute

is a gathering

health

p

44

is a capability

is a climate

glamour

p

45

is a lifestyle

is an informant

honey

p

46

is a food

is a surprise

garden

p

47

is a responsibility

is an opinion

patriot

p

48

is an enthusiast

is a plan

education

p

49

is an advancement

is an insect

flower

p

50

is a blossom

is a gadget

moment

n

1

is a duration

is a fashion

prairie

n

2

is a terrain

is a solution

gender

n

3

is a distinction

is a
transportation

manner

n

4

is a behavior

is a festival

paint

n

5

is a decoration

is a virus

method

n

6

is an approach

is a character

detail

n

7

is a feature

is a store

avenue

n

8

is a destination

is an
announcement

basket

n

9

is a container

is a villain

elevator

n

10

is a machine

is an amount

quart

n

11

is a measure

is a falsehood
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Table A1 (continued)
Word

Normative valence

Normative

Positive/Neutral

valence rank

YES category

NO category

wagon

n

12

is a vehicle

is a value

poster

n

13

is a display

is a feeling

sphere

n

14

is a globe

is a tree

fabric

n

15

is a merchandise

is a network

industry

n

16

is a production

is an artist

theory

n

17

is an idea

is a team

patient

n

18

is a client

is an article

item

n

19

is an object

is a process

material

n

20

is a component

is an echo

hay

n

21

is a feed

is a fight

history

n

22

is a major

is a ship

lawn

n

23

is a property

is a port

office

n

24

is a room

is a human

kettle

n

25

is a cookware

is an observation

context

n

26

is a situation

is a science

column

n

27

is a support

is a reunion

phase

n

28

is a division

is a mystery

statue

n

29

is a recognition

is a trust

month

n

30

is an interval

is a charity

clock

n

31

is a fixture

is a slogan

journal

n

32

is a reflection

is a dress

elbow

n

33

is a joint

is a system
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Table A1 (continued)
Word

Normative valence

Normative

Positive/Neutral

valence rank

YES category

NO category

cord

n

34

is a string

is a currency

trunk

n

35

is a base

is a myth

inhabitant

n

36

is a creature

is a flaw

ink

n

37

is a fluid

is a topic

rattle

n

38

is a noise

is an element

hydrant

n

39

is a valve

is a school

hammer

n

40

is an instrument

is a currency

curtains

n

41

is a barrier

is a procedure

board

n

42

is a surface

is a philosophy

pamphlet

n

43

is a publication

is a choice

glass

n

44

is a substance

is a treaty

square

n

45

is a shape

is a thought

thermometer

n

46

is a mechanism

is a crime

knot

n

47

is a bond

is a forest

nonsense

n

48

is a mockery

is a symbol

errand

n

49

is a journey

is a building

stool

n

50

is a furniture

is a nation
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Table A2
Presented word

Sample Participant Word List
Presented

Counterbalanced

Individual

Individual

Normed

Normed

Category

Yes/No category

P/N rating

0-100 rating

Valence

rank

cash

is an asset

Y

P

100

p

3

beach

is a landform

Y

P

100

p

9

diamond

is a notion

N

P

100

p

13

heart

is an organ

Y

P

100

p

29

health

is a climate

N

P

100

p

44

spouse

is a relation

Y

P

99

n

24

dinner

is a fulfillment

Y

P

95

p

35

success

is a smell

N

P

94

p

4

promotion

is an electronic

N

P

94

p

6

vacation

is a luxury

Y

P

94

p

7

excellence

is a souvenir

N

P

93

p

2

wedding

is a custom

Y

P

93

p

16

flower

is a blossom

Y

P

93

p

50

music

is a ship

N

P

92

p

8

star

is a luminary

Y

P

92

p

31

jewel

is an intuition

N

P

92

p

40

reward

is a season

N

P

91

p

27

angel

is a waterway

N

P

90

p

26

baby

is a youth

Y

P

89

p

5

applause

is a field

N

P

89

p

28

fabric

is merchandise

Y

N

10

n

15
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Table A2 (continued)
Presented word

Presented

Counterbalanced

Individual

Individual

Normed

Normed

Category

Yes/No category

P/N rating

0–100 rating

Valence

rank

cord

is a string

Y

N

10

n

34

paint

is a decoration

Y

N

9

n

5

material

is an echo

N

N

8

n

20

thermometer

is a mechanism

Y

N

8

n

46

prairie

is a solution

N

N

7

p

2

sphere

is a tree

N

N

6

n

14

kettle

is an

N

N

5

n

25

observation
moment

is a fashion

N

N

4

n

1

item

is a process

N

N

-5

n

19

square

is a shape

Y

N

-5

n

45

stool

is a furniture

Y

N

-5

n

50

column

is a support

Y

N

-6

n

27

statue

is a recognition

Y

N

-6

n

29

curtains

is a procedure

N

N

-7

n

41

month

is a charity

N

N

-8

n

30

hydrant

is a school

N

N

-8

n

39

avenue

is an

N

N

-9

n

8

announcement
girl

is a description

Y

N

-10

p

41

quart

is a falsehood

N

N

-10

n

11
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APPENDIX B
MINI-MENTAL STATE EXAM

99

Figure B1.

Mini-Mental State Exam

100

APPENDIX C
SHIPLEY VOCABULARY TEST

101

Figure C1.

Shipley Vocabulary Test
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APPENDIX D
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE

103

Age
Please type in your current age. Enter "r" to refuse.
Sex
Please type in your sex. Enter "r" to refuse.
Ethnicity
Enter 1 for Hispanic or Latino
Enter 2 for not Hispanic or Latino
Enter "r" to refuse
Race
Enter 1 for American Indian or Alaska Native
Enter 2 for Native Hawaiin or other Pacific Islander
Enter 3 for Asian
Enter 4 for White
Enter 5 for Black or African American
Enter "r" to refuse
Education
Please enter your highest completed level of education.
Grade School: 5, 6, 7, 8
High School:
9, 10, 11, 12
College:
13, 14, 15, 16
Graduate:
17, 18, 19, 20, 21
Enter "r" to refuse to answer.
Health
Please rate your overall health from 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor).
Enter "r" to refuse to answer.
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APPENDIX E
BAYES MODEL COMPARISONS

105

A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using using JASP (2020; Version 0.14.1)
for each of the three dependent variables. In each case, the data was compared to the best fitting
model to determine whether there was strong evidence to accept the null. The best fitting model
always produces a Bayes Factor (BF10) of 1 because the model is always compared to itself. To
determine the BF10 for additional model comparisons, the BF10 for each model including the
added factor was divided by the model without the added factor. All calculated Bayes Factors
were assessed using a scale developed by van Doorn et al. (2020).

Figure E1.

Scale Used by van Doorn et al. (2020)
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Table E2
Free Recall Bayes Comparison Model with Added Factor/ Model without Added Factor
Model with added factor

Model without added factor

Bayes

Evidence

factor
(BF10)
age group = 2.992e-22
(valence + age + valence*age) = 5.709e-11

null = 1.590e-21

.185

moderate

(valence + age) = 2.336e-10

.244

moderate

(agreement + age) =

.143

moderate

(valence + agreement) = 1

.191

moderate

(valence + agreement +

.016

strong

(agreement + age + agreement*age) =
7.138e-16
(valence + agreement +

3.021e-15

valence*agreement) = .191
(valence + agreement + age +
valence*agreement + valence*age +

valence*agreement) = .191

agreement*age + valence*agreement*age)
= .003
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Table E3
JOL Magnitude Bayes Comparison Model with Added Factor/ Model without Added Factor
Model with added factor

Model without added factor

Bayes

Evidence

factor
(BF10)
age group = 3.080e-22
(valence + age + valence*age) = 6.454e-11

null = 1.625e-21

.189

moderate

(valence + age) = 2.466e-10

.262

moderate

(agreement + age) =

.251

moderate

(valence + agreement) = 1

.177

moderate

(valence + agreement +

.016

strong

(agreement + age + agreement*age) =
7.535e-16
(valence + agreement +

3.004e-15

valence*agreement) = .177
(valence + agreement + age +
valence*agreement + valence*age +

valence*agreement) = .177

agreement*age + valence*agreement*age)
= .003
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Table E4
JOL Accuracy Bayes Comparison Model with Added Factor/ Model without Added Factor
Model with added factor

Model without added factor

Bayes

Evidence

factor
(BF10)
age group = .284

null = 1

.284

moderate

valence = .802

null = 1

.802

weak

agreement = .197

null = 1

.197

moderate

(valence + age) = .228

.211

moderate

(agreement + age) = .053

.189

moderate

(valence + agreement) = .151

.265

moderate

(valence + agreement +

.004

strong

(valence + age + valence*age) = .048
(agreement + age + agreement*age) = .01
(valence + agreement +
valence*agreement) = .04
(valence + agreement + age +
valence*agreement + valence*age +

valence*agreement) = .04

agreement*age +
valence*agreement*age) = 1.418e-4
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APPENDIX F
IRB APPROVAL

110

Figure F1.

Approval Notice: Making Memories and Predictions
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